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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
“To dissuade and defeat threats as early and as far from U.S. 
borders as possible.” 
 
Program Objective: Through the National Security Institute, conduct, coordinate and 
collaborate maritime defense and security research, experimentation, and information exchange 
between partnership universities; federal, state, and local agencies; national laboratories; the 
maritime industry, and international partners. 
 
The Maritime Defense and Security Research program (MDSRP) was part of the 
National Security Institute (NSI) — a cooperative research institute whose members include the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), University of California at Santa Barbara (UCSB), and 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The purpose of the MDSRP was to conduct, 
coordinate and collaborate maritime defense and security research, experimentation, and 
information exchange between partnership universities; federal, state, and local agencies; 
national laboratories; maritime industry, and international partners through the NSI. During its 
seven year operating period, the MDSRP created a community of interest with over one thousand 
members; inspired interagency cooperation through meetings, symposia, and short education 
programs; motivated interdisciplinary research and experimentation in maritime domain 
awareness, national maritime policy, and counter-piracy; and created a venue for government, 
industry, and academia to address maritime security issues.  
In collaboration with other sponsors, the MDSRP also underwrote several major field 
experimentations at NPS including the maritime interdiction experimentation by Tactical 
Network Topology (TNT), the Coalition Operating Area Surveillance and Targeting System 
(COASTS) and the Seaweb system of networked underwater sensors.  Other programs receiving 
MDSRP funding include the NPS Graduate School of Engineering and Applied Sciences 
(GSEAS) maritime domain awareness (MDA) work and environmental impact on sensors. The 
MDSRP also gave initial funding to the Maritime Information Sharing Task Force (MIST) 
which, co-sponsored with the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), continues to hold 
 xxviii 
workshops in several U.S. domestic regional ports to research policy barriers to information 
exchange between commercial entities and government agencies. Additionally, MDSRP 
supported faculty labor and travel to attend various Maritime Homeland Defense and Security 
conferences or host them at NPS. Finally, MDSRP support allowed NPS to publish and distribute 
the monthly SITREP e-newsletter which reported national research initiatives related to maritime 




This report represents a compilation and summary of the work of a multitude of researchers, 
scientists, academicians, students, and warfighters. A generous thanks is extended to all 
those whose work contributed to the success of the Maritime Defense and Security 
Research Program (MDSRP).  
 
The MDSRP also wishes to thank all those that keep our nation safe. 
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 1 
I. ORIGINS AND BACKGROUND  
FOUNDING MISSION STATEMENT: use the warfighter’s perspective 
to detect, dissuade and defeat maritime threats and aggression against the 
U.S. and its citizens. 
The Maritime Defense and Security Research Program (MDSRP) was designed as 
an umbrella initiative to coordinate and execute various maritime defense and security 
exercise, research, and education programs at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and 
with other academic, interagency, government, industry and international organizations.  
These programs included systems research into the political, organizational, technical, 
and physical aspects of MDA, response, and port security; direct support to the Navy‘s 
maritime domain awareness (MDA) research and experimentation spiral; short courses in 
maritime interagency planning; red cell activities associated with maritime counter-
terrorism and counter-piracy; and field experimentation work.  Students were integrated 
in all aspects of these programs providing them ―hands on‖ experience in solving relevant 
operational issues that could then be applied throughout their career while establishing 
life-long interagency and international contacts.  The MDSRP also supported a classified 
repository of knowledge and documents concerning MDA and maritime defense and 
security issues at the NPS Dudley Knox Library for government agencies and 
researchers.   
A. BEGINNINGS 
In early December 2003, NPS was tapped by the Office of the Assistant Secretary 
for Homeland Defense to form a research and investigative task force to address issues 
surrounding the protection of the U.S., its vessels, and citizens against threats originating 
in the maritime domain. Leveraging funds provided by Congress for research to affect 
military operations called the Center for Defense Technology and Education for Military 
Service (CDTEMS), the NPS Maritime Domain Protection Task Force (MDP-TF) was 
formed in response to Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD(HD)) 
McHale‘s request to provide his staff insight in various areas concerning protection from 
maritime terrorist threats.  Organizational efforts began in January 2004, and within a 
 2 
month included over twenty-five faculty and fifteen students proposing research in the 
following areas: 
 Vulnerability and threat assessment 
 Systems architecture and integration  
o Interagency command and control (C2) in the maritime domain 
o Layered concept of operations (CONOPS) for maritime homeland defense 
 Maritime domain awareness 
o Data tagging and fusion 
o Systems design and multi-level security 
o Intelligence collection and dissemination 
 Port security and infrastructure 
 Mid-ocean real-time local environmental predictions to aid in intercept operations 
 Secure archiving of research information in the maritime domain 
 Creation of a Maritime Domain Protection Lab and Wargaming facility 
As of March 2004, over fifty NPS faculty, students and staff had aligned their 
research with this new venture, complimenting established research areas. In addition to 
on-campus resources, the MDP-TF created over sixty points of contact from various DoD 
and federal agencies concerned with MDA; C2; and operations to detect, deter, defeat, or 
nullify terrorism in the maritime domain. 
Within the first few years of operations the MDP-TF evolved into the Maritime 
Domain Protection Research Group (MDP-RG) at the behest of the NPS Board of 
Advisors, however per guidance from the ASD(HD) maintained the goal of defeating and 
dissuading threats originating in the maritime domain.  
In its first fifteen months of operation the MDP-RG was formed, research efforts 
progressed significantly, and interest more than tripled. The MDP-RG served as an 
umbrella for many different research initiatives, ranging from conducting threat 
 3 
assessments to developing MDA technology to designing a systems engineering 
architecture for MDP. Together, these initiatives provide essential input to the national 
MDP effort and will assist in the development of a more complete and effective MDP 
system. In just under a year and a half, the MDP-RG‘s accomplishments included:  
 Published an ―AS IS‖ description of the current national MDP system  
 Conducted classified intelligence, strategy, and technical seminars to bring 
different federal agencies together to meet and explore solutions to common 
objectives  
 Created a Maritime Domain Protection Wargame facility capable of classified and 
non-classified CONOPS analysis 
 Proposed an systems architecture for use of Biometrics for civilian merchant 
crews 
 Participated in national level MDA efforts including reviewing draft national 
guidance 
 Created a community of MDP stakeholders, drawn from industry, national labs, 
government agencies, and local officials  
 Assisted in establishing a Homeland Security Digital Library at NPS 
 Supported local law enforcement through internship opportunities 
A neutral facilitator between the many Department of Defense and other 
governmental agencies interested in Homeland Security (HLS) and Homeland Defense 
(HLD), the MDP-RG successfully brought together engineers, scientists, law 
enforcement, military, government, contractors, and NPS faculty, staff, and students – 
each bringing a unique perspective and expertise to the issue of maritime domain 
protection.   
1. Filling a Gap 
The ASD(HD) leveraged NPS to define, design, and potentially implement a 
national maritime domain protection (MDP) system that included a vulnerability 
 4 
assessment, concept of operations across multiple lines of defense and domains, and was 
coordinated through a national command and control system. Looking at MDP from the 
warfighter‘s perspective, the group focused on how to dissuade, deter, preempt, interdict, 
or defeat threats and aggression as early and as far from U.S. borders as possible.   
The combination of a diverse and talented faculty with background in 
interdisciplinary approach to DoD problems, a secure research environment, and 
operationally experienced students from DoD and the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) focused on applying graduate education towards national complex issues 
made NPS the ideal home for this effort. Additionally, the lack of institutional bias and 
potential as a base for long-term efforts due to low faculty turn-over rates added to the 
appeal. 
2. Initial Goals 
The MDSRP was formed to investigate issues surrounding protection of the U.S., 
its vessels, and citizens from terrorist threats originating in the maritime domain. The 
initial stated goal of the group was to coordinate, research and investigate issues 
involving the DoD‘s responsibilities and roles in Homeland Defense. Stakeholders 
included a variety of agencies and offices throughout the U.S. and several international 
allies. In the first few years of existence, the MDSRP explored methods to define, design, 
and aid the implementation of a national MDP system to assist in defeating maritime 
terrorism as early and as far from U.S. borders as possible. 
Near term goals identified to be addressed in the first eight to fifteen months of 
the program launch were: 
 To complete an initial vulnerability assessment 
 To produce an ―AS IS‖ system architecture description 
 To produce a needs and requirements document 
 To build a Maritime Domain Protection Modeling and Gaming Laboratory  
 To coordinate MDA research across NPS campus-wide efforts; and  
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 To cross communicate within a developing community of interest 
B. THE PLAN 
The midterm program goals to be addressed in the first three years were to:  
 Draft proposed National Maritime Domain Protection Architecture 
articulating CONOPS and command structure, then test this proposal in 
interagency/joint war game 
 Develop an MDP Library database for classified interagency reference 
 Begin port infrastructure analysis in relation to support of U.S. force 
projection 
 Extend current data mining and fusion techniques and systems based on 
requirements generation 
The long term program goals projected out five years were to: 
 Refine and implement national MDP CONOPS 
 Continue use of MDP lab and wargaming facility to test Unified 
Command Maritime CONOPS 
 Complete port infrastructure analysis in relation to support of U.S. force 
projection, begun in the mid term 
 Develop automatic data mining and fusion systems for multi-level security 
access 
 Evaluate alternative platform capabilities for MDP 
1. Building a Collaborative Community 
The 9/11 Commission identified maritime ports as a major vulnerability point for 
our nation. An early identified need was to have a symbol to unify the diverse group of 
stakeholders involved in MDP. Members of the MDSRP created a logo representing the 




 Shield: Represents Protection 
 Stripes: Represent American Strength 
 Stars: Represent Patriotism 
 Anchor: Represents the Maritime Domain 
 Olive Branches: Represent Peace 
Many diverse members of this ―club‖ still wear the MDSRP logo as a lapel pin 
symbolizing their dedication to the tenets of MDP. 
a. SITREP 
To meet the growing request for information sharing amongst 
geographically diverse stakeholders, an early MDSRP effort was to produce and 
distribute a monthly e-news brief covering the spectrum of maritime domain defense and 
security research. Called the SITREP to represent the foundational mandate to establish a 
current ―situation report‖ of disparate MDP efforts, the first issue was released in 
February 2004. Each issue of the SITREP introduced on-going maritime security research 
projects at NPS, from the National Security Institute, or other research institutions or 
agencies working in MDP. Since its first issue, the SITREP has been sent to an ever 
growing list of stakeholders ranging from academics, researchers and scientists; to 
warfighters and military strategists; to policy analysts and decision makers worldwide. 
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The final issue of the SITREP, volume 56, will be released in December 2011 and will be 
sent to a distribution list of over 1,200 MDP stakeholders. 
b. Monthly meetings 
Since 2004, the MDSRP has hosted monthly meetings on the NPS campus 
to showcase current projects and facilitate a ―round robin‖ to allow current MDSRP 
members to update the full group on the status of their work. Off campus partners have 
participated regularly using either voice or video conference technology available in 
several locations on campus. In his most recent book Where Good Ideas Come From: the 
natural history of innovation, cultural commentator and popular science writer Steven 
Johnson cites the work of Kevin Dunbar of McGill University that found the most 
conducive environment for research innovation was not the lab but the conference table 
in the form of monthly meetings. Dunbar wrote, ―the results of one person‘s reasoning 
became the input to another person‘s reasoning…resulting in significant changes in all 
aspects of the way the research was conducted (quoted by Johnson, 2010).‖ 
2. Research and Thesis Opportunities 
With the MDSRP in residence at NPS, a program function was always to foster 
the continuing education of resident and non-resident NPS students. All NPS students 
must complete a thesis or major projects as part of their degree program, and potential 
research topics related to MDP were proposed as an early effort of the new MDSRP. 
Some examples from this initial detailed list produced in 2005 were: 
1) The idea/feasibility of a Multinational Joint Fusion Center focused on Caribbean 
Basin issue – i.e. either a separate center based in another country and/or foreign 
liaison officers added to Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center, Atlantic Region 
(MIFC LANT) much like Joint Interagency Task Force, South (JIATF-S) does. 
2) Organizational topics:  Identify "lanes in the road" for the National Maritime 
Intelligence Center (NMIC) and the MIFCs? Could also look at the U.S. Coast 
Guard‘s (USCG‘s) Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC) or ICC vis-à-vis. 
area/district intelligence staffs. 
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3) Identify respective roles for USCG intelligence personnel and U.S. Navy (USN) 
intelligence in homeland security? 
4) Issues of intelligence sharing and corruption among Latin American partners on 
the war on drugs/ terrorism. Is it wise to entrust our intelligence methods and 
information to these highly volatile governments? 
5) Sharing law enforcement information: overcoming obstacles in the beltway. 
6) Identify/assess some national technical capabilities that will be needed to attain 
MDA (drones, sensors, integrated navigation and tactical systems (INTs), etc…). 
7) Identify the roles of the local, state, and federal government and the private 
owners and operators of critical infrastructure in Maritime Homeland Security. 
8) Improving the security of the cargo supply chain without hindering the free 
movement of legitimate cargo. 
These thesis topic areas were later consolidated and refined as follows: 
 Vulnerability assessments 
 National C2 structure 
 International waters Intercept and Defeat CONOPS development 
 Shipping and container industry initiatives and cooperation opportunities 
 Data mining, storage, and fusion 
 Port infrastructure 
 Allied opportunities 
At the close of FY11 over 150 student theses and projects had been completed 
with MDSRP support. This support was in the form of funded faculty serving as thesis 
advisors, mentors, and readers; or direct funding for individual student research activities. 
A representative listing of MDSRP supported student theses is included as an appendix to 
this report (see Appendix D). 
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3. Seed Money 
MDSRP funding from Navy accounts was $1.0M per year through FY11. This 
was provided as a DoD Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) in the 2006 Defense 
Program.  Separate research dollars from various sponsors and research collaborators 
were also leveraged to inspire program success. 
Anticipating this resource allocation on the federal level, MDSRP funding was 
always envisioned as seed money to get new programs off the ground, not as a primary 
funding source for continuing work on established projects. A prime example is the 
Maritime Information Sharing Taskforce (MIST) (see section II:A:17). Originally 
conceived as a joint project between NPS and the Department of Transportation‘s 
(DOT‘s) Maritime Administration (MARAD), the prototype MIST event held in the 
combined Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach was fully funded by MDSRP. The next 
two MIST events were only partially funded by MDSRP, with other federal level 
sponsors providing resources. The fourth MIST event in Philadelphia in 2010 was fully 
funded outside the auspices of the MDSRP. The MIST Boston process, with a research 
event in September 2011, was again sponsored fully beyond MDSRP. Without initial 
seed money, this important research project would not have gotten off the ―white paper‖ 
proposal stage. But after maturation, the program has realized its full potential and is able 
to solicit funding on its own. 
With the close of the MDSRP, many supported projects and programs detailed in 
this report will continue to evolve with alternate funding sources – several of these are 
cited in the closing section (see section III:B ). However, without the initial MDSRP seed 
money, many of these same programs would have never gotten started. 
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II. PROGRAM REVIEW 
The NPS National Security Institute‘s MDSRP was an inclusive multidisciplinary 
program that supported the research of over forty NPS faculty and their students in 
partnership with a variety of off-campus members from multiple agencies, national labs, 
industry and academia (see Appendix E). These programs included various research 
projects to develop maritime operational planning aids, red teaming projects, and 
education programs; various maritime awareness initiatives from multilevel security to 
barriers to information exchange with industry; and an extensive field experimentation 
program that explores the latest technology in unmanned systems (UxS), mobile C2 
capabilities, and reach back data transfer and monitoring. Over the course of eight years, 
the MDSRP provided seed money for over twenty programs and projects, and served as a 
partner as projects evolved. These programs fell into three major areas: 
 Research 
 Education (including symposia, short courses, and red team activities) 
 Experimentation 
The MDSRP‘s multiple initiatives all fell within the following major mission 
areas: 
 Maritime warfare research 
 At sea, in port and field experimentation programs 
 Exploratory research programs 
 Education and red teaming programs 
The MDSRP consistently emphasized collaboration with other services, agencies, state 
and local governments, industry, and allies. A representative listing of partners is 
included as an appendix to this report (see Appendix E). At the close of FY11 the 
MDSRP leaves several functional projects ready to move to the next step. These include: 
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 A three course International Maritime Security Certificate program ready to be 
delivered to a professional student audience 
 Emerging research into reinforcing institutional integrity to support maritime 
regional security 
 Modeling of port security systems and their effectiveness 
 Risk assessment tools in maritime critical infrastructure protection (CIP) and 
platforms versus intercepts 
 Visualization of data analysis 
A. RESEARCH 
MDSRP supported research programs ran the gamut as far as subject areas, 
perspectives and approaches. Leveraging NPS faculty, staff and students with strong 
academic credentials and significant operational experience, mission areas researched 
related to UxS threat analysis, USW effectiveness and projects of benefit to maritime 
operational planners. Some projects that started as research, evolved into experimentation 
programs. Others informed coursework and became thesis topics. Still others were 
operationalized on the national level, informing CONOPS and maritime security policy. 
1. Systems Engineering and Integration  
The goal of the Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I)  Team was to 
establish an overarching, open architecture for a nationally integrated MDP system that 
would best support the nation‘s effort in preventing terrorists from exploiting the world‘s 
oceans to attack the U.S., its forces, its force projection capability, and other interests. 
The multi-year SE&I effort focused on the delivery of a proposed architecture on which 
to base future process and technical design. This was a collaborative project between 
several NPS faculty and students from the USN, USCG, U.S. Northern Command 
(USNORTHCOM), and other MDP project participants from various government 
agencies. 
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Using a multilevel architecture engineering process (see Figure 1), the SE&I 
Team 1) defined the MDP problem, 2) developed an MDP architecture engineering 
methodology, 3) developed operational and threat scenarios for modeling and testing 
architectural alternatives, and 4) identified and assessed an ―AS-IS‖ MDP system 
(document number NPS-097-04-005, For Official Use Only (FOUO)). Researchers also 
performed preliminary functional requirements and initiated a modeling and simulation 
effort to support architectural design for an MDP system.   
 
Figure 1. MDP Architecture Engineering Process 
 
SE&I researchers initially concentrated on evaluating current MDP efforts and the 
myriad of organizations involved in maritime defense. Through a comprehensive review 
of relevant literature, interviews with vital stakeholders including USNORTHCOM, U.S. 
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Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), 
USCG, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), U.S. Navy Forces North (NAVNORTH), 
the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and 
participation in MDP conferences and symposia, SE&I researchers compiled an 
assessment of the current national MDP system capabilities (document number NPS-097-
04-005, FOUO). 
SE&I faculty team members included Tom Huynh, Orin Marvel, John 
Osmundson, Gene Paulo, and Mark Stevens.  
POCs: Dr. Tom Huynh (thuynh@nps.edu) and Professor Mark Stevens 
(mstevens@nps.edu)  
a. SEA-7 Cross Campus Study: Port Security & Malaccan Strait 
Navigation Safety (Singapore/LLNL) 
The SE&I research effort described above evolved to include an NPS 
cross campus integrated study coordinated by the seventh Systems Engineering Analysis 
(SEA) cohort students for their graduation capstone project – referred to as the SEA-7 
Cross Campus Study. This SEA cross campus study was essentially a systems study 
requiring international cooperation titled ―Maritime Domain Protection in the Straits of 
Malacca,‖ and focused on large ship and port security in the Port of Singapore and the 
nearby Straits of Malacca.  As the topic was well within the MDSRP topic areas of 
interest, the program offered faculty and funding support to the SEA-7 student team. NPS 
GSEAS students, in collaboration with students from the Temasek Defense Systems 
Institute (TDSI) in Singapore, designed and assessed various system-of-systems 
architecture alternatives for countering threats to and from large ships in the Straits of 
Malacca, including: sensor suites, communications, C2, and reactive forces for a coalition 
of nations.  The GSEAS team also designed and assessed ship inspection architecture 
alternatives for detecting explosive and dangerous materials in order to prevent a large 
cargo ship from being used as a terrorist vehicle. Robotic systems were considered as a 
component of this ship inspection system.  Findings of this study were presented in June 
2004 at NPS. The study was also presented to ASD(HD) staff and to an international 
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audience at the Asian Military Operations Research Symposium in Malaysia at the 
request of Commander, Pacific Command. A final project report is available upon request 
(MDP CC4913 Final Report). 
 
Figure 2. Singapore/LLNL cooperative systems study 
 
The following year, the cross campus study conducted by the eighth 
cohort of SEA students (SEA-8), Maritime Domain Protection-Countering Terrorism 
from the Sea, also looked at a topic area important to the MDSRP. Faculty expertise and 
research were offered to assist this group as well. Findings were presented in June 2005 
(see Figure 2). Subsequent SEA cross campus topics related to the MDSRP included port 
maritime interception (2006), global fleet stationing (2007), extended maritime 
interdiction operations (2008), and developing a system of systems that would combat 
and defeat mines and underwater improvised explosive devices (IEDs) placed in U.S. 
ports (2009).  
SEA cross campus studies continue as an integral part of NPS student 
interdisciplinary work, and are available for review online. Visit 
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http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Programs/SEA/subpages/ArchivedProjects.html for more 
information and links to final presentations and reports. 
POCs: Dr. Gene Paulo (eppaulo@nps.edu) and Jeff Kline (jekline@nps.edu)  
b. MDP Joint C4I Capstone Study, June 2004 
The SE&I research team also supported a student effort to employ the 
―observe, orient, decide and act‖ (OODA) framework to develop a MDP C2 architecture. 
Thirteen students from the NPS Information Science (IS) Department analyzed 
organizations and commanders, speed of decision and response time latencies, and 
decision processes and processors – doctrine. Information trade-offs, sensor and 
communication requirements, rules of engagement (ROEs), and legal requirements and 
constraints were also part of the student lead study. As a result of their analysis, students 
proposed an ideal structure for a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) ―plus X‖ 
organization. 
 
Figure 3. JIATF+ X organizational structure proposed by Joint C4I students 
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The students presented a proposed organizational structure (see Figure 3) 
to maximize the interactions between civilian and military personnel.  The student led 
team recommended that a USCG Rear Admiral should head the JIATF because the 
USCG bridges the gap between military action (Title 10) and law enforcement (Title 50).  
In addition, they recommended that a DHS Security Senior Executive Service civilian be 
the deputy.  The Chief of Staff (COS) would be a uniformed member of any service, 
supported by a Judge Advocate General (JAG) Officer or legal counsel.  The team 
contended that it would be necessary to keep the legal recommendations separate from 
intelligence, operations and law enforcement.  In addition, USNORTHCOM would have 
a liaison officer keeping his parent command apprised of any impending actions which 
they may have to take. To further the integration between the uniform and civilian staff 
members, they used Joint Interagency (JI) directorates and letter codes, rather than 
numbers as a traditional military staff might. 
This structure has many similarities to standard military command 
structures.  However, the major difference lies in the two added divisions: Law 
Enforcement and Plans & Policy.  Both would be integral to conducting successful MDP 
operations because DoD assets will be required to work closely with law enforcement 
agencies. Additionally, they recommended that the Intelligence Directorate be headed 
with a Colonel or Captain (USN or USCG) because of the relative importance of MDA to 
MDP.  The Operations and Law Enforcement directorates will be closely linked for 
administrative and operational functions.  The operations directorate is a fluid division as 
service components send forces into and out of the operational control of the JIATF+ 
commander. The Plans and Policy Division would include representatives from State, 
Homeland Security, Justice and (when needed) Energy departments so that political 
options can be used instead of military operations or law enforcement actions.   
Standard administration, logistics, and C4I (command, control, computing, 
communication and intelligence) support would be included in the makeup of the 
architecture.  Also fluid in the architecture will be international representation.  They will 
serve as a link to any foreign country‘s logistical support and law enforcement. The 
student team emphasized that absolutely necessary to the success of the JIATF+ was the 
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coordination and integration between the Intelligence Watches (MIFC) and the 
Operations Watches.  All elements of the intelligence, operations, law enforcement and 
legal agencies were represented.  
POC: Dr. Dan Boger (dboger@nps.edu) 
2. SEA-13: Maritime Interdiction Operations in Logistically Barren 
Environs  
In January 2008, forty-seven students from the U.S., Singapore, Israel, and 
Taiwan organized and responded to tasking to develop a system capable of conducting 
Maritime Interdiction Operations in a logistically barren environment. The purpose was 
to immerse students in the realities of being a systems engineer to find solutions to 
complex problems. They set their direction, organized, and identified and integrated other 
students and faculty from across campus as well as subject experts and stakeholders 
outside the school. In this project, the students acted as lead systems engineers to conduct 
a major integrated project on topics relevant to the U.S. Navy and participating 
stakeholders. They worked in a six month delivery schedule for a final report and briefing 
in partial fulfillment of their requirements for a Master of Science (MS) degree in 
Systems Engineering and Analysis (SEA). A key factor in the success of the SEA-13 
students was to respond appropriately to the various limitations imposed on maritime 
operations to satisfy their mission objectives and avoid marooning critically-needed 
forces in logistically-barren environs.  
The SEA-13 final report is available for review at 
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Programs/SEA/subpages/projects/2008Spring.html.  
POC: Professor Gary Langford (golangfo@nps.edu) 
3. Threat and Vulnerability Assessment (TVA) Team  
This research was based on two overarching assumptions: 1) incremental 
academic and scholarly rigor will lead to continued improvement for government policy 
makers and operational decision makers, resulting in practical application of advances in 
shared expertise and knowledge; and 2) increased communication at the operational level 
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will allow for more accurate and timely threat assessments, resulting in shared threat 
identification and moving us toward elimination of seams in maritime vulnerabilities. The 
Threat and Vulnerability Assessment (TVA) Team focused on developing and compiling 
comprehensive threat and vulnerability assessments needed to identify weaknesses, 
discern the likelihood and intensity of potential dangers, and help focus protection and 
forward action. Their goal was to identify where to direct assets to minimize threats. 
The TVA team‘s work evolved to include the following definition of risk: 
Risk = (Threat + Vulnerability) - Capability 
This formula reveals that capabilities can be developed to mitigate risks, even though the 
threats are still there.  Capabilities reduce vulnerability. This risk equation demonstrates 
that increased understanding of threats eases mitigation efforts.  This idea might seem 
obvious now, but it was not so obvious to the team in 2004.  What this formula really 
demonstrated is that risk can be managed. 
Members of the TVA Team were CAPT Steven Ashby, USN, Professors Mitch 
Brown and Paul Shemella, and NPS students LCDR Robert Hight, LT Mark Steliga, and 
LT Jay Dewan.  
POC: Professor Paul Shemella (pshemell@nps.edu) 
a.  TVA Symposium, June 2004 
In June 2004, the TVA Team energized a growing community of interest 
by organizing and conducting an initial TVA symposium with a carefully selected group 
of participants from military, government, and the private sector (see Figure 4).  
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Figure 4. (L to R) Prof. Mitch Brown, NWC, Monterey Campus, and Mr. Frederick Ferrer, Senior 
Policy Analyst, Office of the ASD (HD) at the TVA Symposium, June 2004 
 
One of the goals of the June symposium was to foster an extensive 
―network of networks‖ among government, military, and the private sector, as an initial 
outreach to stakeholders in maritime domain protection issues. Approximately forty 
personnel from diverse organizations and fifteen representatives from NPS and the Naval 
War College shared their time and expertise. The three day event was dedicated to 
identifying threats and dangers to U.S. security, matching threats to vulnerabilities, 
improving methods for assessing threats, and envisioning a ―future and forward‖ look at 
maritime domain awareness. The final portion of the symposium was dedicated to panel-
driven and discussion-oriented vignettes, in which conference attendees were broken into 
two groups and given the task of dealing with several scenarios which threaten U.S. 
interests in the maritime domain. In their after action report on this event released in 
September 2004, the TVA Team demonstrated that vulnerability assessments are on-
going but rarely tested or generically applied, and the process of matching threats to 
vulnerabilities is conducted in an ―ad hoc‖ manner. This report is classified SECRET 
NOFORN.  
b.  Building TVA “Network-of-Networks” 
In 2005, the TVA researchers continued to build and improve this 
―network of networks‖ (see Table 1) through table-top and lab war gaming techniques to 
more thoroughly investigate identified and potential threats to existing vulnerabilities, 
both known and unknown. This research built on the advantages gained from an 
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increasingly robust threat identification process.  Researchers then focused on the more 
difficult issue of assessing vulnerabilities.   
 
Table 1. TVA Efforts toward Building a "Network of Networks" 
RADM Porterfield, Director of Naval 
Intelligence (DNI): 
Addressed Naval Intelligence students on their 
thesis work.  
Admiral Robert Murrett, DNI: Provided guidance and vision to students working a 
variety of related theses 
CDR Jay Steadman, Senior Intelligence Officer, 
Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Multiple 
Threat Alert Center: 
Addressed over 20 intelligence officers on MTAC‘s 
current threat assessment and procedures they are 
currently using for assessments 
LT David Sanchez, U.S. Southern Command: Led a seminar discussion on SOUTHCOM‘s 
counter-terrorism operations 
CAPT Tim Doorey, Joint Chiefs of Staff Crisis 
Management: 
Provided insight on JCS activities regarding the 
Global War on Terror 
Mr. Dave McDonald, U.S. Pacific Command 
Intelligence Architectures: 
Provided briefings and discussions on how 
horizontal integration can assist the threat and 
vulnerability assessment process 
LT Todd Gleghorn, NPSAlumni: Provided insight into CNO Intelligence Plot 
procedures and the impact of open source 
intelligence on threat assessments 
Mr. William Arras, Digital Globe and Mr. Steve 
Holsinger, OSO: 
Provided practical insights on how to better use 
commercial and national imagery for HLD/HLS. 
Mr. Bill Moffet, Central Intelligence Agency, 
Office of Military Affairs: 
Led a seminar detailing how working military and 
the CIA could better integrate assessments.   
LtCol Curt Reidel, AFOSI Liaison Officer, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation: 
Provided students and faculty insight into how 
counterintelligence is conducted and measures 
being taken for improvement. 
Mini-Symposium with JIATF-W J2 [CAPT 
Marc Luoma, USN JIATF-W J2 Representative, 
CDR Robert Dean, USCG and Mr. Shawn 
James, Lockheed Martin Vice President]: 
The symposium covered issues from organization to 
transnational crime and analytical techniques for 
improving HLD/HLS. 
 
Student Participation: Several students attended conferences and 
conducted research and field work, including visits 
to imagery and signals intelligence (SIGINT) sites, 
Air Force TENCAP, USAF Space Command and 
USNORTHCOM Headquarters, to gain insight into 
techniques and procedures to improve threat 
assessments. 
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4. Applied At-Sea Technology  
NPS experience in supporting field tests on radar/infrared (IR) sensor 
performance suggests that, for port and coastal security, surveillance must consider 
atmosphere and ocean surface effects. The environmental conditions affecting sensors, 
the size and speed of targets involved, and the threat procedures important to MDP are 
very different from ship self-defense against mach-1 surface-skimming missiles. Hence, 
special integration of models and testing of approaches are necessary. 
The goal of the Applied At-Sea Technology research project was to describe the 
current state of threat and own-force detection capabilities in the national MDP system 
when including atmosphere and ocean surface conditions which influence radar 
(refractivity profiles) and IR (thermal contrast, absorption, and aerosol scattering) sensor 
performance. The project was based on the transition of models and procedures 
developed for USN sensor performance prediction, to apply in port and coastal 
surveillance and also in response detection estimations (see Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5. Atmosphere MDA Rf/IR impact 
NPS has participated in meteorology and oceanography impact assessments in 
almost every major optical and radar propagation field test involving the USN over the 
last decade. MDSRP support enabled special analyses of this data to describe the current 
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state of MDP.  The sampling and analysis methods derived from these tests were applied 
in a fleet exercise involving low cross-section targets.  The approach followed in the 
Applied At-Sea efforts was similar to that applied previously in collaboration, 
consultation, collection and interpretation with regard to detection of low cross section 
surface and submarine mast targets.  In fiscal years 2004 and 2005, these applications 
included: 
1) Follow-on analyses for MDP objectives of results from Naval Special Warfare 
Command directed field tests (2002-2004) on combatant craft detection, 
2) Participation in an electronic surveillance measures (ESM) vulnerability study 
with Submarine Development Squadron 12 (CSDS12) off San Clemente Island, 
California (July 2004), 
3) Participation and analyses of results from the Trident Warrior/Silent Hammer 
fleet exercise (with sub assets) off San Clemente Island, California (October 
2004), 
4) Participation in a IR detection field test in San Diego Bay, performed for a Naval 
Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) ship self-defense program, on IR detection, 
5) Participation in Monterey Bay based USSOCOM demonstrations involving 
radar/EO surveillance sensors, now occurring,   
6) Providing faculty direction and support to students within NPS Cross-Campus 
Integrated Study: Maritime Domain Protection in the Straits of Malacca,   
7) Continued participation with NPS MDSRP 
The At-Sea Technology Team provided special guidance and support to sensor 
team students, divided into a radar group and an EO/IR group, working on one of three 
projects carried out by the SEA-7 students as part of the cross campus integrated study 
MDP in the Straits of Malacca (see report section II:A:1:a). This effort is significant 
because it focuses MDP on important regions, such as the PACOM area of responsibility, 
regarding the potential impact of the conditions and procedures for meeting surveillance 
requirements.  SEA-7 involvement reflects collaboration with a USPACOM partnering 
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country (Singapore) through special curricula.  The meteorology involvement occurs due 
to both our own demonstrated atmosphere/effects models and procedures and the 
partners‘ need.   The project applied models that related predictions and measurements to 
inputs for the effects models such as APM/AREPS (Rf) and TAWS/IRBLEM/EOSTAR 
(IR). 
The MDSRP supported Applied At-Sea Technology Research Team‘s work was 
featured in the MDSRP SITREP, Volume 4, May 2004, ―Applied At-Sea Technology 
Research, Estimation of Atmosphere and Ocean Surface Influence on Radar and IR 
sensor Performance for MDP,‖ describing littoral region distance versus time-of-day 
variability of predicted two-way loss, exclusively caused by measured variability of 
atmosphere and ocean surface condition, during an August field test off Dam Neck, 
Virginia.  Unclassified effects for a test of radar signatures of low cross section 
combatant craft were included. 
Members of the At-Sea Technology Team were Drs. Kenneth Davidson and 
David Tucker, and Professor Rex Buddenberg.  
POC: Dr. Ken Davidson (kldavids@nps.edu)  
a. Atmospheric Detection Effects Prediction Tool (ADEPT) 
 NPS and collaborating groups are involved in the transition, for MDP, of 
technology and procedures for the estimation of lower atmosphere and ocean surface 
condition impacts on the detection of low radar cross section and low IR contrast targets, 
and the real-time display of the detection predictions in command centers and on 
operational platforms to aid in tactical decision making. A demonstration for such 
transition efforts, with special information on lower atmosphere and ocean surface 
conditions, was performed during the Trident Warrior/Silent Hammer (TW/SH‘04) fleet 
exercise. TW/SH‘04 was conducted off the U.S. West Coast in the vicinity of San 
Clemente Island, California, in early October 2004.  
The collection and handling of meteorology and oceanography (METOC) 
data in TW/SH had two broad objectives; to address the requirement for METOC data to 
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be transmitted and made available by networking technologies for the operational 
decision makers; and to develop and demonstrate a concept for a tactical and operational 
planning decision aid which provides situational awareness based on real-time METOC 
data. The NPS objectives called for an integrated mobile adaptive networking platform 
with communication devices, supporting a satellite constellation approach for orbital data 
transfer. The NPS objectives also called for using collected METOC data as a tactical and 
operational decision aid and for improving situational awareness. This was accomplished 
by integrating in situ and satellite-borne sensor collected METOC data, external location 
mesoscale atmosphere prediction and analyses model data, environmental effects 
prediction model results, and the data transfer technologies of the first objective into a 
system for the in-field processing of the collected METOC data. The ―system‖ that was 
developed and demonstrated was named the Atmospheric Detection Effects Prediction 
Tool (ADEPT).  
The demonstration met the two major objectives and further analyses/ 
interpretation of the TW/SH data will be applicable to a variety of MDP situations in 
which predictions of RF propagation and optical sensor performance are critical to 
situational awareness.  Principal participants on the ADEPT team included Dr. Ken 
Davidson, Dr. Alex Bordetsky, and LT Brian Harp, USN. 
POC: Dr. Ken Davidson (kldavids@nps.edu)  
b. Sensor Performance in Various Maritime Environments: Models 
to Planners to Sea 
This project used atmospheric variables to answer the question: Can 
propagation models and operational data support maritime interdiction operations 
(MIO) and surveillance requirements? The project formulated and demonstrated tools to 
predict impact on allied and threat force near-surface platforms and people by radar or 
infrared waves, or intercept of communications. The technology incorporated and 
integrated multi-source high resolution airflow and surface data to predict airflow and 
surface impacts on radar detection and vulnerability and communications intercept during 
submarine operations.  
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Principle Objectives included: 1) test in field exercise 
adaptations/modifications of MSPP and Atmosphere Detection Effects Prediction 
(ADEPT) impact tools; and 2) develop models and procedures to meet needs of decision 
makers in submarine operations: 
 NPS Bulk Surface Layer model 
 Coupled Atmosphere Ocean Mesoscale Prediction System (COAMPS) 
 Satellite Sensor 
 Electro-magnetic (EM) propagation effects model  and electro-optical 
(EO) target acquisition model  
 Effects model  
Milestones identified to fielding capacity included: 1) demonstrate 
operational use of tool; 2) field tests in surrogate locations; and 3) qualitative radar data 
and EO/IR data. Key deliverables included: 1) model formulation for detectability; 2) 
demonstration of impact estimation to detectability levels for first responders and 
communications; and 3) design and test platform sensors. 
Key participants included Dr. Ken Davidson and Dr. Peter Guest of NPS, 
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) Systems Center in San Diego, 
Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center (FNMOC), and USCG Research 
and Development (R&D) Center.  
POCs: Dr. Ken Davidson (kldavids@nps.edu) and  Dr. Peter Guest 
(pguest@nps.edu) 
c. Atmosphere impacts on AIS transmissions for Maritime Defense 
and Security 
A study in which predicted and observed atmospheric conditions were 
compared with received AIS signal data was undertaken. It was designed to improve 
predictions of AIS signal ranges.  Also applied were knowledge and analysis tools on 
atmospheric and surface conditions that impact AIS signal reception.  The latter are 
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refractive conditions that influence the range of surface emitted Rf signals, e.g. surface 
based ducts. The study focused on atmosphere and surface data obtained from coastal 
locations since these are more detailed than analyzed fields with regard to features that 
influence transmission.  AIS ranges exhibited a high degree of variability related to 
seasonal coastal atmosphere conditions, with ships‘ signals detected at distances of up to 
2,000 km.   
Quantification of the impact on range with measurable and predicted 
atmospheric conditions will be the objective of ongoing studies, which will be guided by 
data compilation and preliminary results of this study.  Figure 6 shows an example of the 
AIS signal analysis, to which operational meteorological data are applied.   
 
Figure 6. AIS signals, April 2009 
The AIS signals from distant ships could be detected at coastal stations because 
transmission ranges were extended by atmosphere refraction anomalies.  Shown are 
extended ranges for April 2009,  divided into three periods that experienced short, 
medium and long ranges.  From 12 -18 April, the ranges observed were moderate (green); 
from 19 – 24 April, the ranges were very large (magenta), and from the 27th -30th of the 
month, the ranges were quite short (blue).  Observed and predicted atmosphere data, from 
operational forecast centers, and network provided observations are being related to these 
results.  
 28 
In addition to such case studies, the study enabled collaboration with 
investigators of atmosphere refraction phenomena occurring around the globe.  These 
collaborations have yielded atmosphere descriptions.  These descriptions are key to 
suggested follow-on studies. 
POCs: Dr. Ken Davidson (kldavids@nps.edu) and Arlene Guest 
(aguest@nps.edu) 
d. SoS Approach for Atmosphere Impact for Singapore Region 
MDSRP funding enabled cooperative research to begin with Singapore in 
FY11 to develop a system-of-systems (SoS) based on NPS atmosphere impact 
assessment methods, with USV platform measurement by Singapore resources (see 
Figure 7). Other planned program elements included: 1) to plan major marine defense 
field program with SoS approach; 2) to use knowledge and improved decision aids to 
create a network-centered operational procedure for best incorporating environmental 
information; and 3) to document system-of-systems fusion of all data to enhance 
surveillance systems performance in coastal regions. 
 
Figure 7. System-of-Systems approach for atmospheric impacts in the Singapore region 
Program objectives were to: 
 Provide military, law enforcement and other security personnel 
with real time and future information on how the environment will 
affect anti-terrorist or anti-piracy operations in coastal and off-
shore locations in the Singapore region.  
Within AOR:
- Detect surface contacts
- Detect WMD
- Relay contact info to Intel
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 Develop, verify and improve models and procedures on the basis 
of comparisons of predictions with actual in situ observations of 
conditions and surveillance impacts. 
 Develop and improve tactical decision aids (TDAs) for use in 
actual interdiction operations  
 Use adaptive networks and other developing technologies for 
providing real time interconnectivity for situational awareness, 
data transfer and communication 
Milestones to fielding capability were identified as: 
 Perform rapid transition existing procedures and models to 
Singapore region, guided by system of systems approach 
 Perform environmental impact predictions for the days of any 
Singapore-based  field program, occurring within FY11   
 Report or journal article with results and recommended tuning of 
TDAs for the Singapore region  
Key deliverables will be a report on results and recommended tuning 
TDAs for the Singapore region, and an evaluation of the use of small unmanned boats for 
environmental measurements. Since this is an active research effort in FY11, the key 
deliverables will be post MDSRP.        
POCs: Dr. Ken Davidson (kldavids@nps.edu), Dr. Tom Huynh 
(thuynh@nps.edu)  
5. TNT/MIO: Environmental Effects Research  
Observed and predicted atmosphere data determined the current and future 
conditions which, along with radar and optical sensor specifications, allow estimating the 
impacts of atmospheric profiles of temperature, humidity, aerosol and optical turbulence. 
Products were produced and made available to relevant personnel in easy-to-understand 
graphical formats using the TNT network (see Figure 8). Other important atmospheric 
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effects such as plume dispersion, sea state, precipitation and other weather events were 
predicted and displayed using different models but similar procedures. 
 
Figure 8. Example of atmospheric impacts on marine interdiction operations 
In the future, such products will be automatically available on the world-wide web or a 
closed network for use by law enforcement and military group in the advent of an actual 
or attempted maritime terrorist attack. Shown below (see Figure 9) is the first responder 
vessel instrumented for tests. The position of instrumentation is indicated with an arrow. 
Low cross section cross-section identification occurred concurrent with optical detection. 
 
Figure 9. Equipment used to measure atmospheric effects in field tests 
Although heavily reliant on experimentation elements, this program was 
fundamentally research in nature. Members of this research team included Dr. Peter 
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Guest, Dr. Ken Davidson, Mary Jordan and Dick Lind of the NPS Department of 
Meteorology.  
POC: Dr. Peter Guest (pguest@nps.edu)  
6. Identification and Documentation of the Content and Structure of 
Existing National MDP Data Sources 
One of the central challenges of MDA is the identification, tracking, and analysis 
of large numbers of moving assets. Not only must the volume of assets be identified and 
tracked in near-real time, but the number and variety of data sources is large, 
compounding the problem. These sources must be fused and analyzed in order to produce 
a timely result that can be acted upon, thus the need to design and build a prototype MDA 
system that can be evaluated for its effectiveness in thwarting maritime threats. 
The core of an MDA prototype system is an MDA Data Warehouse containing 
cleansed and fused data collected from a variety of data sources. Data analysis, mining, 
and anomaly detection tools will enable analysts to access the data in the warehouse to 
support data analysis and the discovery of useful and previously unknown patterns and 
relationships. To this end, this MDSRP supported research effort focused on developing a 
prototype knowledge-based system to help intelligence analysts identify data sources 
needed to further analyze perceived threats. The prototype system would allow analysts 
to retrieve information about numerous data sources through a variety of flexible 
methods. These data sources include those maintained by the USCG, USN, DHS, 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the greater IC, individual State and commercial 
sources, foreign government sources, and open sources; and were collected from 
platforms, sensors, wireless, and terrestrial networks. 
The overall objective of this MDA data effort was to address the issue of 
designing and implementing an MDA Data Warehouse, with a five-step development 
methodology: 1) define the data sources, 2) develop the data model, 3) cleanse and fuse 
the raw data, 4) populate the warehouse, and 5) provide data analysis, anomaly detection, 
and mining tools to access and analyze the data in the warehouse. These steps were 
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performed iteratively as design changes emerged during the various stages of 
development. 
POC: Dr. Magdi Kamel (mnkamel@nps.edu)  
7. MDA System Demonstration 
There is no one intelligence source that provides enough data to allow for the 
definition of the Essential Elements of Information for MDA. This research project 
defined candidate architecture for MDA and identified tools and technologies to comprise 
a successful system for multiple consumers at multiple levels of security. Rather than 
build a new database, this project aimed to provide tools and portals to existing databases 
to be integrated into the stakeholder‘s existing workstations.  MDA, a necessary part of 
any MDP system, requires access to applicable data sources, at all classification levels, 
and tools to manipulate and display data. This MDA System Demonstration effort 
focused on improving MDA by providing tools and portals that can be integrated into a 
stakeholder‘s existing workstation, providing faster access to more accurate and useful 
MDA information. 
NPS faculty and students interacted with industry to evaluate tools under 
development for data fusion and tracking. The faculty also supervised two capstone 
design projects: 1) in the Space Systems Operations curriculum, which involved the 
design of architecture for a global MDA system; and 2) in the Joint C4I Systems 
curriculum, which involved the design of a command and control architecture for MDA. 
8. MDA Sensor Fusion 
In response to national strategy statements, several projects supported in part by 
the MDSRP set about to examine fusion of various information and intelligence sources 
concerning MDA. These projects sought to address specifically the directive within the 
National Plan to Achieve MDA (October 2005, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSPD_MDAPlan.pdf) to ―Integrate and network 
existing platforms to enhance shared situational awareness. Likewise, ensure that all 
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future acquisitions are integrated and networked with appropriate sensor technologies (p. 
15).‖  
a. National Sensor and MDA Fusion 
An established classified and on-going program partially funded by the 
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO),  MDSRP funding enabled greater participation 
with DoD Ph.D. candidates at NPS to address technical and security challenges. 
Program objectives included: 
 Develop an overall system architecture for the MDA enterprise 
 Develop unusual data sources and evaluate their contributions 
 Explore novel fusion techniques 
 Evaluate existing fusion tools 
 Develop enterprise level multi-tiered security solutions 
Key project deliverables included: 1) a formal model and methodology for 
certification and accreditation of multilevel security (MLS); 2) an evaluation of a specific 
data source in the context of project Fairgame; 3) provide real-world data and 
information flows (see Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10. National sensor and MDA fusion model 
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Additional project funding beyond MDSRP came from U.S. Strategic Command 
(STRATCOM), NRO, Navy Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program 
(TENCAP) and the DoD. NPS Professor Herschel Loomis led this effort. 
b. Overhead and National Sensor Integration to MDA 
The stated goal of this effort was to correctly detect ship track source 
positions, the for the initial manual detection methods leading to automated methods. 
This project also aimed to reduce uncertainties where possible using successive imagery, 
incorporate mean layer wind data to reconstruct source vectors, and add the ability to flag 
erratic or unusual behavior of source vectors (see Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11. NPS ship track detect and analysis 
An evolving project, the team intends to continue work on data fusion 
efforts for domain awareness, and develop end-product tools for this environmental data 
set.  
POC: Dr. Herschel. Loomis 
9. Optimization of Sensor Allocation for Search and Surveillance in 
Maritime, Littoral, and Urban Environments 
Information-rich, dynamic environments require efficient and effective allocation 
of search resources to be successful. Success criteria include: 1) integrate multiple 
sources of diverse information for an aggregate awareness; 2) select and assign 
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appropriate search assets to refine representation of current world state; and 3) report and 
advise commanders on high likelihood locations for target presence. Currently, 
performance of search and surveillance in operational and tactical scenarios is limited by 
information-processing and decision-making capabilities. The results of this project 
endowed commanders with 1) a real-time search asset planning tool, 2) efficient 
integration of multi-source information, and 3) dynamic situational awareness 
representation. 
 
Figure 12. Optimization of sensor allocation for search and surveillance in maritime, littoral, and 
urban environments 
The team used probabilistic modeling, implementing Bayesian filtering to support 
evolution of multiple target dynamics and achieve real-time integration of observation 
information. They also employed three-stage real-time rolling-horizon optimization of 
sensor selection, platform allocation and operation decisions (see Figure 12).  This model 
was successfully demonstrated during Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment 2011 and 
adopted in a Navy tactics publication. 
Primary team members include NPS faulty members Dr. Moshe Kress, Dr. 
Johannes O. Royset, and Dr. Timothy H. Chung. 
POC: Dr. Johannes O. Royset (joroyset@nps.edu) 
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10.  Assessment of Maritime Domain Protection Capabilities 
Maritime Intercept Analysis 
Models for surveillance of waters around a port quantify the number of response 
platforms needed to address misclassification of neutral vessels as hostile. The system of 
systems consist of two types of platforms: sensing platforms and response platforms. 
Sensing platforms can detect possibly hostile vessels with error. Response platforms 
travel to the detected vessel to further investigate and possibly detain. The service time of 
a response platform tends to be longer than that of the sensor platform. The goal of this 
project was to provide quick-response analytical decision aids and planning tools, 
delivering an economical system of equations with solutions and graphs (see Figure 13) 
to suggest or indicate likely behavior of a new system-of-systems to ultimately guide 
often costly exercise planning and system acquisition. This work was completed at the 
request of ASD(HD) staff. 
 
Figure 13. Probability hijacked D-Ship is inspected before reaching port 
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The overall technical objective was to improve and enhance the cost effectiveness 
of exercise and systems acquisition using analytical modeling and simulation by creating 
mathematical (probabilistic, statistical) models of entire system-of-systems. To meet this 
objective, the team conducted an operations analysis of a maritime domain awareness and 
protection problem. Researchers analyzed a scenario involving a hostile Red force, for 
instance small boats or other submersibles, arriving in a friendly Blue littoral domain, 
possibly near a port. The intent of the Red force was to cause damage after reaching land. 
The domain in the scenario was under surveillance, e.g., by one or more radar and IR-
equipped aircraft, helicopters, or UAVs, possibly cued by a satellite-borne sensor. The 
littoral area contained neutral or White vessels, interspersed with hostile Reds: the Whites 
in the scenario could be mistaken for Reds, diverting the overhead sensor.   
The goal of this project was to predict Blue force requirements, including 
numbers and types of Blue surveillance platforms and escort vessels, to determine 
effective CONOPS and minimize the "leakage" of lethal Reds through the littoral 
domain. Factors considered included the specification of the "random" rate of arrival of 
Reds, the density of Whites classified incorrectly as Reds, and the range and 
classification capability of the Blue sensors. The problem-solving approach used was to 
construct and manipulate quantitative models that predict the successful performance of 
various Blue forces against possible patterns of Red behavior.  
The desired result was to limit the chances of lethal Reds crossing the littoral to 
valuable Blue assets on land or on targets such as oil-drilling platforms in the littoral.  
This result had to be achieved in a cost effective manner. The model‘s parameters were 
allowed to be influenced by environmental conditions, such as "ducting," as well as 
dynamic evasive behavior by the Reds and the density of non-lethal White false targets.  
Model-formulation and manipulation is being actively pursued on various versions of 
generic homeland protection problems explored as war game scenarios. The results of 
this project provided considerable insight and assisted in intelligent design of exercises 
and actual operational planning. 
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Members of this Operations Analysis Team were Professors Donald P. Gaver 
(dgaver@nps.edu) and Patricia A. Jacobs (pajacobs@nps.edu), LT Brett C. LeFever 
(USN), Major Kim Chuan Chng of the Republic of Singapore Navy, and H. Sato from the 
Japanese military. 
POCs: Dr. Donald Gaver (dgaver@nps.edu) and Dr. Patricia Jacobs 
(pajacobs@nps.edu) 
11. Maritime Port Security and the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) 
Threat 
A critical threat to commercial and military port security is a terrorist of state laid 
mine. Several MDSRP coordinated projects studied this threat and ways to counter it. 
a. Analysis of Commercial Asset Effectiveness in Locating 
Underwater Explosive Devices in Domestic Ports 
This project examined the detect and classify capabilities for Remus 
vehicles, and compared the navigational accuracy between Remus variants. As a baseline 
for future computer change detect software, the effect of bottom cluster density on 
change detection by operators was also determined. The primary research question 
centered on the accuracy gained from navigational system hardware and software 
upgrades on the Remus underwater vehicle. All types of positioning errors were taken 
into consideration. The focus of analysis on navigational error was to ensure accurate 
positional reporting of mine like objects for future reacquisition and prosecution. 
Analysis of bottom clutter effects on change detect performance was used to determine 
maximum levels of clutter in which change detection can be performed by current 
techniques. This baseline analysis was intended to be used to determine the effectiveness 
of automated change detect software. 
The stated project goal was to analyze bottom clutter effects on change 
detect performance by current maximum levels of clutter in which change detection can 
be performed by current techniques. This baseline analysis was used to determine the 
effectiveness of automated change detect software. This project determined the 
probability of detect and classify methods for Remus vehicles and compared the 
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navigational accuracy between Remus variants. The effect of bottom clutter density on 
change detection by operators was identified as a baseline for future computer change 
detect software. To ensure accurate positional reporting of mine-like objects for future 
acquisition and prosecution, the analysis evaluated the accuracy of recent navigational 
system hardware and software upgrades on the Remus underwater vehicle compared with 
previous versions. 
 
Figure 14. At right, side scan sonar image of initial bottom objects  
(Kline 5000); at left, side scan sonar image of same area at a later date indicating changes in bottom 
objects 
The project objective was to analyze measures of performance as per 
Tactical Development Plan (TACDEV 08-03) and develop baseline change detect 
software parameters from current operational procedures (see Figure 14). Identified 
analysis milestones included: 
 Assist in the development of the Data Collection and Analysis Plan for the 
San Diego Harbor Maritime Homeland Security (MHS) Experiment 9-14, 
December 2007 (see Figure 15) 
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Figure 15. Chart of San Diego Harbor MHS Experiment areas 
 Observe data collection operations in San Diego Harbor 
o Observe data collection with Orca Maritime (Remus UUV) 
o Observe data collection with EOD Unit 7 (Kline 5000) 
o Observe Post Mission Analysis performed by Orca Maritime 
 Coordinate with Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), Panama City and 
the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) for receipt of 
remaining MHS data 
 Perform change detect procedures with varying bottom clutter conditions 
 Conduct analysis and publish results 
Deliverables included a final report in the form of two NPS student theses 
that detailed 1) the effectiveness of commercial asset use in MHS scenarios, 2) the 
navigational accuracy of the Remus unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV), and 3) the 
minimum change detect performance for future software; all accompanied by supporting 
data including human change detect performance as a function of bottom clutter density. 
Key participants included NPS students LCDR Dale Johnson (MS Operational Research 
– OA, March 2008) and LT Jason Barrett (MS Operational Research – USW, September 
2008). 
POC: RADM Rick Williams, USN (ret.) (rdwillia@nps.edu)  
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b. Maritime IED (MIED) Cross Campus Study 
In cooperation with the NPS JIEDDO research program,  this study 
involved the fourteenth cohort of Systems Engineering Analysis students (SEA-14) and 
was published in December 2008 under the title ―Systems Approach to Defeating 
Maritime Improvised Explosive Devices in U.S. Ports.‖ Insight gained from terrorist 
attacks, training exercises, and intelligence intercepts over the past few years has shown a 
renewed interest in the use of mining as an effective means of disrupting commerce and 
damaging critical infrastructure. In an attempt to develop a system of systems 
architecture to defeat mines and maritime IEDs (MIED), the project team developed 
several system alternatives, or Adaptive Force Packages, that incorporate both existing 
systems and emerging technologies. Overall performance was assessed using a US Joint 
Forces Command sponsored war game simulating an MIED attack on ports based on the 
geography of Seattle and Tacoma. A critical analysis of the alternatives based on 
performance, suitability, cost, and risk were carried out. The study results showed that 
increases in performance are attainable with mixed results in cost and risk, and the report 
highlighted necessary actions and considerations that must be taken by military and 
civilian leaders in order to adequately prepare for and counter MIEDs in U.S. ports. The 
SEA-14 study concluded that primary to reducing the effects of an MIED attack to the 
maritime transportation system (MTS) is a standardized, nation structure that has the 
ability to 1) conduct baseline bottom surveys of ports and harbors, 2) process and retain 
the survey data, and 3) provide a timely and infrastructure-safe means of neutralization. 
For more information, see the SEA-14 final project page at 
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Programs/SEA/subpages/projects/2008Fall.html.  
POC: RADM Rick Williams, USN (ret.) (rdwillia@nps.edu)  
12. Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection Scenario Demonstrations for 
Risk Analysis and X3D Visualization 
The NPS MOVES team updated exemplar facility-protection scenarios to 
illustrate risk elements and possible defensive responses.  Software capabilities included 
production of 3D location and vehicle models (see Figure 16), as well as agent-based 
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tactics and rules of engagement for opposing and defending forces. The scenarios 
extended past proven work that permits quantitative analysis of risk, behavioral capture 
in agent-based behavior libraries, and visualization of scenarios to confirm realistic 
responses.  Reports included a detailed plan for pursuing of potential follow-on work for 
a single facility and then Navy-wide deployment. 
 
Figure 16. X3D visualizing of a potential terror threat to USN high value assets 
In the first two phases, this project produced a lightly scripted tactical 
demonstration of how the developed tools illustrated risks and tradeoffs for naval facility 
protection. Using these tools, the team produced an analytic reporting statistical analysis 
of risk corresponding to various threat responses. Key deliverables included a summary 
report delivered to the Project Officer that included proof-of-capability demonstration 
results and the integrated facility-upgrade plan. Design considerations included display, 
tactical development, data collection, analysis, life-cycle methodology, and cost-benefit 
alternative recommendations for training. Recommendations for future work were also 
identified, including the creation of war gaming scenarios of interest. 
Based on results and guidance from the second phase facility evaluation, the team 
produced a plan to enable deployment across all naval facilities. 
POC: Dr. Don Brutzman (brutzman@nps.edu)  
13. Center for Infrastructure Defense (CID) 
By viewing our critical infrastructure through the eyes of intelligent adversaries, 
we discover how systems can be extremely fragile, and how we can mount effective 
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hardening and defensive efforts. Principle activities at the Center for Infrastructure 
Defense (CID) include understanding: 1) How infrastructure systems will respond to 
major disruptions – deliberate (e.g., sabotage, vandalism, terrorism, war) and non-
deliberate (accident, failure, natural disaster); and 2) How to invest limited resources (for 
hardening, redundancy, or capacity expansion) to make these systems resilient to 
disruptions. To this end, the CID supported in part by the MDSRP has completed over 
one hundred ―Red Team‖ case studies in the following areas: 
 Energy: electric power, natural gas, petroleum reserves 
 Transportation: roads and bridges, mass transit, ports 
 Data and Voice Communications 
 Emergency Preparedness and Response 
 Supply Chains 
 Site Security: airports, military bases, heads of state, Super Bowl 
 Critical Project Management 
Most recently, CID completed an analysis of the Hawaiian Island MTS. Results 
were provided to the USCG Captain of the Port (COTP). This work was supported by 
MDSRP funding. 
POC: Dr.  David Alderson (dlalders@nps.edu)  
14. Maritime Domain Awareness: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
(TTP) Process Definition and Reengineering 
This work is direct support to USN efforts to develop a coalition and interagency 
MDA capability, including understanding interagency policy and technical barriers. Fully 
titled ―Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) CONOP to TTP Process Definition and 
Reengineering Employing Network Centric and Services Oriented Architectures‖, the 
intent of this project was to refine a project plan that documents process (see Figure 17), 
constraints to process and impact of technology as an input to CONOP and tactics, 
techniques and procedures (TTPs).  
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Figure 17. MDA workflow v11 
The research focused around core operational threads (e.g., standard work flows, or 
―business practices‖). Outcomes were further used for operational field experimentation 
in Trident Warrior 08 planned for execution in June 2008 and supporting venues for 
MDA Spiral-1 (see report section II:C:7:a). This project was intended to span two years; 
and provide feedback from this effort as well as TW08 outcomes and modifications back 
to Fleet participants, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), SECNAV 
and PEO C4I.  
The two key objectives of this research were to 1) develop and manage a project 
plan that would provide CONOP and TTPs around core operational threads, and 2) to 
validate and adjust the project plan using input from operational field experimentation. In 
partnership with MDSRP, this project was also funded by OPNAV via PEO C4I. The 
milestones set for analysis were split into three phases (see Table 2): 
Table 2. Analysis milestones for MDA TTP Process Definition and Reengineering 
 TITLE TIMELINE 
PHASE 1: Discovery  FY07 
PHASE 2: Process reengineering for improved TTP OCT – DEC 2007 
PHASE 3: Delivery, validation and feedback/review of 
proposed TTP changes 
DEC 2007 – DEC 2008 
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Key deliverables identified by the researcher included: 
 ―As is‖ process maps for current MDA work flows, information flows and 
TTP from Fleet Commanders 
 ―To be‖ process improvements for core MDA work flows 
 Coordinated and congruent operational views (OVs), systems views (SVs) 
and technical views (TVs) between MDA Spiral 1, Trident Warrior 08, 
OPNAV N6, and NAVNETWARCOM 
 Baseline MDA CONOP for input to NWDC for further CONOP 
development 
 Baseline TTPs for specified core MDA processes 
 Feedback report from Trident Warrior 08 and other venues derived by 
MDA Working Groups 
POC: Dr. Shelley Gallup (spgallup@nps.edu)  
 
15. A Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) Framework for Seamlessly 
Sharing Data from Multiple Security Domains via a Service Oriented 
Architecture  
The MDSRP partnered with the Navy Technical Capabilities (TENCAP) Program 
and defense-related R&D organizations to develop Radiant Alloy, a system (see Figure 
18) that enables the development of a comprehensive MDA picture through the seamless 
integration and sharing of data across multiple security domains. 
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Figure 18. Proposed Radiant Alloy MDA system architecture 
Under the direction of Professor Bret Michael, CDR Mike Schumann and MAJ 
Randy Arvay conducted research to provide the evidence necessary to certify and 
accredit Radiant Alloy for operation at the highest level of assurance. This research 
provided a foundation for a software engineering process to develop complex, enterprise-
level, multiple level security systems based on service-oriented architecture (SOA) 
systems. 
POC: Dr. Bret Michael (bmichael@nps.edu)  
16. Maritime Information Sharing Taskforce (MIST)  
The Maritime Information Sharing Taskforce (MIST) engages with government 
agencies and private sector shipping to improve the sharing of threat information.  MIST 
is an interagency effort that receives support from the Department of Transportation 
(DOT), DoD, DHS, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). 
Begun in 2008, MIST was a response to a national call for improved collaboration 
between the public and private sectors to help ensure safe and secure ports. By engaging 
local stakeholders in problem solving workshops (see Figure 19) and observing port 
personnel in action, MIST helps identify gaps and best practices in collaboration and 
information sharing, helps surface industry incentives for sharing, and helps explore the 
usability and usefulness of new security initiatives. In response to initial findings 
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showing the interdependence of the maritime, land, and air domains, MIST expanded 
their focus and changed their name in 2011 to include a wider representation of the 
supply chain.  This new Multimodal Information Sharing Team focuses on engaging 
stakeholders across the shipping industry, including stakeholders from seaports, airports, 
trucking, rail and pipelines. To date, MIST has held five events throughout the U.S. at the 
ports of Los Angeles/Long Beach, the Puget Sound, Honolulu, the Delaware Bay, and 
Boston. 
 
Figure 19. Researcher Anita Salem (standing center) in the MIST Puget Sound Workshop 
MIST‘s research goals are to identify barriers, explore best practices, and 
recommend next steps in improving local information sharing. First, MIST findings show 
that there are a number of legal, cultural, procedural, and policy barriers to sharing threat 
information. 2010 findings show that industry-government information sharing is 
improved by addressing issues with interagency and industry collaboration, increasing 
cultural awareness, improving two-way communication, and aligning  financial and 
social incentives to industry motivations. Second, MIST also surfaced a number of best 
practices for collaboration. These practices include the U.S. Customs Trade Partnership 
Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program, the use of Facility Security Officer (FSO) 
subcommittees in Area Maritime Security Committees (AMSC), the expansion of 
industry run education programs for government employees, and the inclusion of industry 
in emergency preparedness activities and interagency operation centers (IOCs) in port 
environments throughout the nation. Finally, MIST identified opportunities for improving 
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the effectiveness of specific information sharing efforts. For instance, in 2010, by testing 
government initiatives directly with industry stakeholders, MIST participants helped 
identify ways to improve the usability of two existing information systems: 1) MARAD‘s 
MARVIEW and 2) the USCG‘s HOMEPORT. MIST also identified and detailed industry 
information sharing requirements. These requirements include the need for information 
that is useful (i.e. helps them in decision making) and is easy to access and use (i.e. 
centralized, available without a security clearance, and easy to navigate.)  
The MIST findings illustrate the importance of building a partnership between the 
public and private sectors—an ―All-of-Nation‖ approach—in order to improve the 
security of the supply chain. The findings are communicated to interagency partners to 
help inform national policy, are provided to local government agencies to improve 
collaboration, and are made available to industry to assist them in their port security 
assessments. All MIST reports are approved for public release and available upon 
request. 
Cited previously in this report, the MIST project is one that is now independently 
funded, and will continue past the close of the MDSRP. Members of the NPS research 
team include Ms. Anita Salem, Ms. Wendy Walsh, Ms. Lyla Englehorn, Ms. Sarah 
Martin, and Dr. Susan Hocevar. Key partners include the DOT Maritime Administration 
(DOT-MARAD), the National MDA Coordination Office (NMCO), the ODNI Global 
Maritime and Air Integration Initiative (GMAII), and the USCG. 
POC: Anita Salem (amsalem@nps.edu)  
17. Towards Real-time System-awareness via Lexical Link Analysis: A 
Learning Agent Technology for Visualization of Unstructured Data 
Systems of Systems (SoS) have increased in component, organizational, technical, 
and management complexity. This project is based on the assumption that the cognitive 
interface between decision makers and a complex system may be expressed in a range of 
terms or ―features,‖ i.e. specific vocabulary to describe attributes and surrounding 
environment of a system. The DoD Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) Research is an 
extremely complex SoS, requiring constant collaboration and decision making. By 
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applying an innovative SoS approach using Lexical Link Analysis (LLA), agent learning, 
and visualization to generate dynamic ―views‖ of elements, attributes, termed ―features,‖ 
to support large-scale decision making for MDA technology acquisition efforts as well as 
irregular warfare at sea, and intelligence collection/analysis automation. This research 
team is prototyping a multi-agent network of between ten and one hundred agents, that 
periodically learn, separate, extract and visualize interesting information from MDA 
technology acquisition data found from such sources such as DoD Maritime Strategy, 
Joint Integrating Concept (JIC), DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy, National Strategy 
for Automatic Identification System (AIS), Maritime Operational Threat Response 
(MOTR) Protocols, MDA requirements of functional needs analysis, capabilities-based 
assessment, Joint Capability Areas (JCA), Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) from Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), User Requirements (e.g. US Northern 
Command and US Pacific Command), Gap Assessments, and Inter-agency Investment 
Strategy, among others. 
The research team also worked with MDA open sources of intelligence ranging 
from vessel ID, location, images, piracy reporting, port operations, container tracking and 
security, weather, shipping schedules and lines, distance measurement tool, marine 
services directories, shipwreck database and casualty reports, maritime commercial 
activities and military exercises; and with the NPS High Performance Computing Center 
(HPC) to install these agents in the Hamming Linux cluster which provides the requisite 
supercomputing and visualizations for this project. Subtitled ―A Learning Agent 
Technology for Data Separation and Visualization from Unstructured Data,‖ the program 
objective is to train synthetic, computer agents to automate the tasks of recognizing 
patterns, separating, and visualizing important descriptions from unstructured data (e.g. 
text documents), and to facilitate and reduce the workload of decision makers and 
intelligence analysts who would otherwise perform the task manually. 
This team also worked with the Modeling of Virtual Environments and 
Simulation (MOVES) Institute at NPS for 3-D visualization and real-time navigation 
through the LLA results using visualization tools such as X3D, AutoMap and Pajek. 
Additionally, one NPS Master‘s thesis has been completed on this topic.    
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Proposed milestones are broken into three phases as follows (see Table 3): 
Table 3. Lexical link analysis proposed project milestones 
PHASE 1 January – February 2010 Select application domain 
PHASE 2 March – October 2010 Deliver a multi-agent network (between ten 
to 100 agents) 
PHASE 3 November 2010 – December 2011 Deliver a real-time monitoring visualization 
interface to multi-agent network 
Three identified principal tasks include: 1) analysis of collected data; 2) research 
and deliver a multi-agent network; and 3) build a real-time monitoring visualization 
interface (see Figure 20).  
 
Figure 20. Example of lexical link analysis PHASE 1 visual representation  
 
The first task involves analyzing collected data from large-scale experimentations 
at DISE/NPS, to facilitate acquisition decision makers in merging, deleting, and acquiring 
new systems and technologies as the results from the experimentation (see Figure 21).  
For example, Trident Warrior 10 (TW10) comprises data and myriad documents 
associated with selected technologies, residing in searchable databases such as ForceNet 
Innovation Research Enterprise (FIRE).  This can help satisfy the need to connect what is 
conceptually important in the data of participating technologies and what warfighters 
need via CNO defined ―Urgent Needs Statements‖ (UNS).  
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Figure 21. Lexical link analysis PHASE 2 paradigm 
The second identified task requires the team to research and deliver a multi-agent 
network, e.g. ~10 to 100 agents, that periodically learn, separate and extract features from 
ongoing unstructured data collected in Task 1, perform data separation using the 
proposed agent learning and visualization techniques. Building a real-time monitoring 
visualization interface to monitor ongoing new technology trends that reflect in the newly 
discovered keywords of unstructured data will complete the third key task. This 
visualization will use a search to link the results, i.e. discovered keywords, back to the 
original documents for validation. Also the big picture needs to be updated and enhanced 
in real-time to eventually achieve multi-modal collaboration models range from exploring 
handheld devices to heterogeneous environments. 
Members of this NPS research team include Dr. Shelley Gallup (Principal 
Investigator and Lead), Dr. Ying Zhao, and Dr. Douglas MacKinnon. Additionally, one 
NPS student member of this team was awarded the Distinguished Thesis Award for their 
work on this project. 
POC: Dr. Douglas MacKinnon (djmackin@nps.edu)  
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18. Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and the Maritime Information 
Exchange Model (MIEM)  
The U.S. and its allies consider excellent situational awareness about the maritime 
domain vital to national security. Current MDA efforts focus primarily on tracking 
vessels, people, and cargo as they move through waterways and transit facilities such as 
ports and particular businesses. While many different systems, belonging to many 
different agencies, participate in collecting and assessing observations about these 
entities, there has not been an agreed way to model and describe this information so 
collaborators could exchange, understand and incrementally improve it. The DoD 
continues to improve information sharing by making information assets understandable 
and accessible where: 1) understandable information consists of familiar types and 
values; and 2) information is accessible when computerized services can obtain it easily. 
―The key to achieving that goal was to create a set of types and values that could be used 
to describe beliefs about maritime entities, relations, and events, as well as the evidence 
for those beliefs. The Maritime Information Exchange Model (MIEM) addresses that 
need by prescribing how to express such beliefs and evidence (Dwyer, et al., 2009).‖ The 
MIEM, a joint project between the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) and NPS, sought to 
accelerate production of actionable intelligence.  
 
Figure 22. The vessel ATLANTIK EXPRESS expressed in XML using the MIEM language 
The MIEM is a conceptual model manifest in an Extensible Markup Language 
(XML) schema that prescribes how to describe and represent dynamic maritime 
situations, to express degree of belief and lines of evidence, and to build up 
comprehensive case files that both machines and humans can understand (see Figure 22). 
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Evolving out of work on a Rich Semantic Track (RST) conceptual model, the MIEM used 
XML, an open-source industry standard, to create a standard sharing language and 
common data structure for maritime related information. The MIEM provides clear and 
concise structures for expressing observations and analysts‘ beliefs about the vessels, 
people, cargo, facilities, relationships, and activities. As information is obtained, 
combined, analyzed and interpreted, the MIEM provides an abstract and flexible structure 
for representing the resulting beliefs and metadata about those beliefs. Use of the MIEM 
further increases production efficiency by allowing for the automation of simple 
processes currently performed by humans. With a common language defined, information 
can be seamlessly shared across the platforms, services, and agencies of the MDA COI. 
The MIEM is a language for building payloads in service-oriented communications such 
as those envisioned by the DoD Global Information Grid and Network-Centric Enterprise 
Services. 
NPS delivered the first MIEM-based product to USCG‘s Maritime Information 
Fusion Center-Pacific (MIFC-PAC). That product automated the assembly of ―targeting 
packages‖ for Vessels of Interest (VOI) from disparate information sources. These 
packages provide information about the vessel and its contents to USCG boarding parties. 
The MIEM provides the foundation for a collaborative approach to sharing and 
continually improving intelligence. To support the mandated move toward whole-of-
government information sharing, the USN has established a partnership with the DHS 
Enterprise Data Management Office (DHS EDMO) and the program management office 
for the National Information Exchange Model (NIEM). Under this agreement, the MIEM 
has become the authoritative information sharing model for maritime data at the federal 
level (Dwyer, et al., 2009). NPS work on this project concluded with assisting SPAWAR 
transition of the MIEM and the rest of the CMA JCTD. 
POC: Dr.  Rick Hayes-Roth (fahayesr@nps.edu)  
19. MMOWGLI  
Beginning in early Spring 2011, MDSRP supported personnel contributed as 
piracy SMEs to a new and innovative educational venture – the Massively Multiplayer 
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Online War Game Leveraging the Internet (MMOWGLI). MMOWGLI is an online game 
designed to find and collectively grow breakthrough ideas to some of our most "wicked 
problems." Many 21
st 
century threats challenge stakeholders to try new forms of 
collaboration that can help create truly innovative ideas. In spring 2011, MMOWGLI 
launched by exploring a fast-paced interactive scenario of piracy off the coast of Somalia. 
Unexpected new forces are flooding the region, while cutting edge tools are pushing fleet 
capabilities and pirate tactics. Meanwhile political-economic disruptions mean that land-
based strategies are just as critical as responses at sea. Invitations to join the MMOWGLI 
effort ask potential players: 
 What if you could remove any obstacle to turn the tide? 
 What if you could collaborate with anyone? 
 What if you had any resource you needed? 
 What can we accomplish together? 
All ideas are needed. Join other innovators and creative thinkers from 
within and beyond the military. Preregister now at http://mmowgli.nps.edu Then, 
watch for a message this spring with your next instructions... and please forward 
this message to anyone else you think may want to play. 
This project is in partnership with the Office of Naval Research (ONR), and is 
currently ongoing. Initial results from the counter-piracy games are being analyzed and 
will be released in report form when complete. 
POC: Dr. Don Brutzman (brutzman@nps.edu) 
 55 
B. EDUCATION 
In addition to research projects, the MDSRP sponsored continuing education 
events, developed courses, and provided red team activities for the maritime defense and 
security community. NPS is viewed as a ―neutral‖ player in interagency discussions, and 
the MDSRP was frequently leveraged as a facilitator for policy discussion. This section 
highlights some of those activities. 
1. Maritime Domain Protection Symposium, August 2004 
Held 18-19 August 2004, on the NPS campus in Monterey, the MDP Symposium 
brought together over fifty commands, departments, agencies, local law enforcement, and 
academic institutions involved in maritime security. During the two day event, numerous 
briefs were delivered on MDP, the status of MDSRP research projects and related efforts, 
providing a unique opportunity for members of the MDP community to learn about 
ongoing projects and share ideas. Symposium presentations were held at various levels of 
classification. Participants cited the many networking opportunities and the chance to 
establish new working relationships as one of the most valuable aspects of the 
Symposium. One of the more unique elements of this Symposium was the MDP Forum, 
in which in which visiting commands and participants were invited to present briefs 
relevant to MDP. The response to this invitation was very strong, with numerous briefs 
presented on a wide range of MDP topics.  
This symposium provided the initial foundation for the National Strategy for 
Maritime Security, released as National Security Presidential Directive 41 / Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 13 (NSPD-41/HSPD-13) in September 2005 
(http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSPD13_MaritimeSecurityStrategy.pdf). A 
collaborative interagency effort led by the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security 
to develop a national strategy for maritime security that built on existing efforts and 
resources, NSPD-41/HSPD-13 establishes policy guidelines to enhance national and 
homeland security by protecting U.S. maritime interests. 
POC: Jeff Kline (jekline@nps.edu)  
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2. Maritime Security Education Courses 
In response to specific CNO guidance in 2006 to ―Develop a post-graduate 
education strategy centered around the Naval Postgraduate School‘s resident and distance 
learning programs that fully leverage Joint service, interagency, and international 
curricula,‖ the MDSRP began working on a Maritime Homeland Defense and Security 
curriculum. Conceived and sponsored by Commander, Pacific Area and Commander, 
Third Fleet, the NPS Center for Homeland Security and Defense in partnership with 
MDSRP developed two pilot courses in Maritime Security Education: 1) the Senior 
Executive Leadership Seminar, and 2) the Interagency Maritime Security Planning 
course. Both courses were intended for an interagency audience and were taught by a mix 
of practitioners and academics from various maritime security organizations. These two 
courses were attended by over fifty students representing local, municipal, regional, state, 
and federal agencies. 
Curriculum developers based their work on the assumption that the nation is 
progressing toward a mature maritime security war game and exercise program 
conducted at the local, state and national level. These are effective programs to test 
concepts, develop operating orders, and train current officials in positions of 
responsibility. The Maritime Security Education initiative is viewed as a natural 
outgrowth from these war games and exercise programs. Its purpose is to educate or 
renew information for officials assuming responsibilities associated with maritime 
security in national and state directives, current threats, integrated information processes, 
and interagency procedures. 
 Primary learning objectives included:  
1) Assist Federal, DoD, and State executive leadership to build on existing 
successes in Homeland Security and Defense (HLS/D) preparedness, and 
strengthen capacity to prevent and defeat terrorism; 
2) Summarize the role of DoD response within the context of Presidential 
Directives, Homeland Security National Strategy, and the National Response 
and Preparedness (NRP) framework; and 
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3) Analyze MDA and appropriate use of Maritime Homeland Security/Defense 
(MHLS/D) assets to national maritime threats. 
As a result of the success of these initial courses, this curriculum is now offered at 
the Naval War College. 
a. Senior Executive Leadership Seminar 
The first of two pilot courses in Maritime Security Education developed 
with MDSRP support, the Senior Executive Leadership Seminar was a one day seminar 
designed for senior officials and flag-level officers. The initial offering of the seminar at 
the NPS Center for Executive Education in August 2006 was evaluated as effective by 21 
participants with an average ranking of 4.6 for overall experience and 4.35 for course 
content on a five point scale. A modified version of this seminar is still part of the CEE 
curriculum. 
This elected official, senior executive service and flag-level one-day 
course addressed current national, state, and local constructs for maritime security using a 
scenario based seminar style format. Participants were divided into smaller working 
groups to address specific issues related to the maritime threat to the U.S. homeland 
presented through real-world scenario analysis. The seminar was held at the unclassified 
level to allow interagency, state, and local participation. Learning objectives included: 
1) Gain familiarity with current terrorist organizations posing a threat to maritime 
security and examine U.S. agencies associated with collecting intelligence in this 
area; 
2) Discuss the various authorities used to conduct operations to detect, deter or 
defeat a maritime terrorist threat, the decision making process involved in 
designating authority, and the impact of those decisions; 
3) Address the issues related to integration of federal efforts with state and local 
authorities and first responders to a maritime security threat; and 
4) Review the latest Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) guidance and 
C3F/PACAREA MHLS/D CONPLAN. 
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The two scenarios reviewed during this pilot course focused on the Long 
Beach/Los Angeles area. The first scenario involved a shipping threat to the port with a 
week-long intelligence lead time that included potential damage to port infrastructure. 
The second scenario was a surprise attack against a cruise ship moored in Los Angeles 
harbor. Each threat highlighted various issues related to interagency coordination in 
preventing and responding to a maritime terrorist attack. 
b. Interagency Maritime Security Planning Course 
The second of two pilot courses in Maritime Security Education developed 
by the MDSRP, the Interagency Maritime Security Planning Course was a four day mid-
level official planner‘s course. The initial offering held in San Diego from 19-22 
September 2006 was evaluated as effective by 29 participants – with an average ranking 
of 4.4 overall, and 4.08 for course content on a five point scale. The course mission was 
to educate military officers (0-4/0-5/0-6), DoD civilians, and Federal and State agency 
members to ensure the readiness of their MHLS/D missions; and to introduce National, 
State, local and DoD statutes, directives, plans, C2 relationships, and capabilities with 
regard to MHLS/D response. This course is now part of the Naval War College 
curriculum. 
POC: Jeff Kline (jekline@nps.edu) 
3. International Maritime Security Program 
The common good derived from freedom of the seas is difficult to overstate.  
International waters are the backbone of global trade. Maritime security then becomes an 
interest to all nations who rely on the sea for trade or resources.  This course sequence 
seeks to address issues related to maritime security, from threats to resources required to 
establish security internationally and in coast regions. 
Building on the curriculum work done to support the Maritime Security courses in 
2006, the MDSRP was tasked by the International Military Education and Training 
(IMET) program to develop a three course sequence exploring all aspects of Maritime 
Security on a global scale. To that end, development of a maritime security certificate 
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program was included as part of the academic year 2009 Naval Postgraduate International 
Military Education and Training course development initiative. The initial tasking 
requested a three course certificate program designed for 90 hours contact time. These 
first three courses were intended as a stand-alone certificate program and for its potential 
inclusion in a graduate degree program in public administration with a specialty track in 
maritime security. This certificate program and possible specialty track currently has 
three completely developed courses ready to be delivered to an international military 
student audience: 1) Introduction to Maritime Security and Planning, 2) Inter-
Organizational Collaboration and Maritime Security, and 3) Maritime Security Resource 
Planning. 
Work is ongoing to find the best venue and delivery framework for this very 
important course sequence, with plans to incorporate this curriculum into an International 
Masters in Public Administration (I-MPA) to be delivered in partnership with 
international academic institutions. 
POC: Jeff Kline (jekline@nps.edu) and Lyla Englehorn (laengleh@nps.edu)  
4. Standing Red Cell Support for Maritime Security Operations 
The MDSRP leveraged NPS students to become Red Cell members with 
analogous knowledge levels typical of real terrorist cell members to address currently 
relevant threats and problem sets. Typically, a Red Cell team conducts research and 
enemy CONOPS planning from unclassified sources. The team then incorporates 
vulnerability assessments into studies, war games, and exercises to test potential 
countermeasures or security procedures. Key program objectives include developing 
potential terrorist courses of action to disrupt maritime security operations, incorporating 
results into vulnerability assessments, improving awareness of potential terrorist threat 
options, and contributing to the improvement of maritime security by informing 
improved countermeasures or procedures. 
The MDSRP supported a plethora of Red Celling across a wide variety of topic 
areas and projects. The three included in this report (see Table 4) are only a 
representative sampling. 
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Table 4. Representative sampling of MDSRP Red Cell activities, 2004-2011 
 
2006 U.S. Navy Ship in Foreign Port, sponsored by 
ASN (RDT&E) 
2008 West Coast Port Attack, sponsored by the 
California Office of Homeland Security 
(OHS)  
2009 Attack against merchant, sponsored by the U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE) 
 
POC: Jeff Kline (jekline@nps.edu) 
a. Assistant Secretary of the Navy – Research, Development, 
Testing & Evaluation (ASN (RDT&E)), 2006 
This effort was in response to the Office of the Secretary of Defense – 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (OSD-ATL) and the Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy – Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation (ASN (RDT&E)) vision to 
develop analogous Red Cell at NPS to highlight national vulnerabilities. The resulting 
Red Cell group consisted of operationally experienced officers, but not subject matter 
experts about potential targets. This group was then tasked to develop attack concept of 
operations and logistics from unclassified sources. NPS added a war game evaluation 
element to the effort. Their first tasking was a scenario involving an attack on a U.S. ship 
in a foreign port. 
The stated mission was: develop a terrorist plot using strictly unclassified 
sources in order to create a disturbance and embarrassment against the United States 
Navy while at a foreign port. The teams used open source data to develop their concept 
and trace logistical support. Red Cell investigated various foreign ports based on the 
following: 
 Historical/repeated visits 
 Vulnerabilities in host nation authorities 
 Accessibility for importation of logistics 
 Location, anchorage points, and web-photos  
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 Liberty Boat time schedules and routes 
 Port facilities and harbor master contact information 
Acapulco was chosen as the scenario locale to conduct a phased attack 
consisting of an underwater IED, rocket-propelled grenade (RPG), ambulance vehicle-
borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), and airborne attack against a USN ship at 
anchor on or about 4 November 2006.  This location was ideal for this scenario because: 
 Approximately 20-25 USN and USCG ships visit Acapulco 
annually 
 There is a Mexican Naval base on the southeast side of 
Acapulco Bay that is never used for U.S. ships 
 It is the second largest port in Mexico, Cozumel being the first  
 There was a U.S. Navy Air Show scheduled there for 4 
November 2006 
The phased operation maximized USN vulnerabilities by: 
 Sea:  Time-delayed underwater IEDs targeting anchorages 
 Land:  Two-stage attack against USN personnel at liberty 
landing  
 Air:  Small aircraft targeting USN vessel or aircraft (suicide) 
The Red Cell Composition included five distinct units (see Table 5). 
Table 5. ASN RDT&E Red Cell proposed composition, 2006 
HQ Team 
 
1- Red Cell Ldr/HQ (Arab), Serves as the spotter and can control 
the remote/command detonator for Ambulance IED 
A-Team “Ambulance” 1- Driver in uniform (Mexican)  
1- EMT in uniform (Arab) 
B-Team “Boat” 1- Boat Operator (Mexican), with help of EMT 
C-Team “Cessna”  
 
1- Pilot (Arab) operates alone and serves as a 2nd pair of eyes. 
D-Team “Taxi” 
 
1- Driver (Mexican) 
1- RPG shooter (Arab) 
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The NPS Red Cell group detailed an insertion plan, logistics (including budget) for the 
proposed attack, and material requirements. These were all detailed in a logistics matrix 
developed from unclassified sources. 
A Blue Team made up of surface warfare officers (SWOs) was tasked to 
develop an in-port security plan (ISP) in accordance with Commander, U.S. 3rd Fleet 
(C3F) guidance. Their basic mission was to implement an in port security plan to counter 
possible terrorist threats. The practical execution of this add-on war game effort took 
place in one full eight hour day, 1 September 2006. Three faculty and five staff, four Blue 
Cell students, four Red Cell students, and two Green Cell members (played Host Nation) 
engaged within this scenario. This war game used computer visualization for situational 
awareness.  
The war game results coalesced into three primary takeaways: 1) the 
underwater attack was unsuccessful because Red Cell planted mines at the wrong 
anchorage; 2) the land attacks were successful because there were extensive casualties at 
the fleet landing, and slowed the ships emergency recall of its crew ashore; and 3) the air 
attack was successful although there was minimal damage to ship (superstructure only), 
few casualties from direct attack, and the casualties from secondary fires were 
unevaluated. Key Blue Cell lessons learned were 1) consider alternative fleet landings, 2) 
request non-published anchorages/moorings, 3) vary from published arrival schedule 
particularly during high visibility events, and 4) provide security and alternative return 
paths to the ship during emergency recalls. Faculty evaluators noted that Red Cell 
successfully developed a feasible concept of operations from unclassified sources; the 
host nation security (Mexico) and Navy AT/FP (NCIS) was not actually challenged, so 
terrorist insertion, integration, and attack execution may have been foiled; and the war 
game element to this Red Cell effort added significant insights in tactical execution by all 
three cells.  These red cell‘s plans and following war game results were briefed by the 
student participants to the ASN (RDT&E) and ten flag officers in Washington D.C. 
b. West coast port attack, 2008 
Specially selected and screened students from NPS and the Monterey 
Institute of International Studies (MIIS) were tasked to characterize vulnerabilities 
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associated with the California Port System and to develop detailed CONOPS to exploit 
its vulnerabilities. Three teams of approximately ten students aided the security interests 
of the State of California by the supporting California Office of Homeland Security‘s 
(OHS) Golden Guardian 2009 Homeland Security exercise. The NPS project portion of 
this exercise focused on using open source information to find specific vulnerabilities 
with California ports.  
Major Vida Beard and Major Brian McCullough, both from the National 
Security Affairs Department in the NPS School of International Graduate Studies (SIGS) 
led two teams comprised of joint students from a cross-section NPS and MIIS. On 10 
April 2008 the teams from this student-led Red Cell exercise, briefed California OHS 
officials on their initial planning efforts. Over forty personnel, consisting of faculty, OHS 
members, local law enforcement and MIIS and NPS students attended the briefings at 
NPS. The stakeholders from OHS planned to take the results of the study back to the 
Governor‘s Office to be considered for inclusion in the state‘s Homeland Security 
Exercise Program, Golden Guardian 2009. The briefings were the culmination of 
planning efforts of two teams over the first two quarters of 2008. The students were 
tasked with investigating problems and weakness with California‘s port system. The 
briefings contained innovative strategies and concepts pertaining to the security of the 
state of California consistent with the tenets of the NPS MDSRP. Over thirty students 
across two red cell teams, participated in the homeland security endeavor, and drew on a 
wide array of military, academic, and personal expertise. 
This Red cell effort demonstrated the value of partnership between federal 
and state entities by delivering meaningful products to the State of California. The 
activity also advanced the education of future national security and homeland security 
leaders at NPS and MIIS.  
c. Department of Energy (DOE), 2009 
This work was accomplished to elevate risk mitigation strategies for 
transport of sensitive material. The results were provided to DOE and are classified. 
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5. Panetta Institute Interns 
Between 2004 and 2011, the MDSRP sponsored three interns from the CSUMB 
Panetta Institute‘s Master of Public Policy (MPP) program. The first Panetta intern, LT 
Bruce Martin of the Marina Department of Public Safety, joined the MDSRP in August 
2004. LT Martin assisted with the development of a federally funded program to teach 
command and control (C2) procedures for law enforcement, including foreign language 
and cross-cultural components. As a Hazardous Materials Responder and Incident 
Commander, certified firefighter, and graduate of the FBI‘s National Academy, LT 
Martin brought the expertise and viewpoint of local law enforcement to MDSRP goal of 
improving MDP. Participation in the August 2004 MDP Symposium helped him re-focus 
his research on current local, possibly regional, issues related to law enforcement, 
firefighting policies, and national security matters. After the symposium LT Martin 
wrote, ―The need for an integrated system, or at least better integration, between DoD, 
Federal, State and local authorities, particularly related to MDA issues, is clear. 
Individually, we have inadequate resources and no coordinated, local emergency plan(s) 
to handle crises at major tourist draws or significant power installations. This could 
impact traffic movement and delivery of critical power (SITREP, vol. IX).‖ His final 
thesis in the form of an applied policy analysis report was titled ―Requirement for Local 
Maritime Domain Awareness Training.‖ 
In October 2008, Panetta Institute graduate student Ms. Lyla Englehorn was 
brought on to assist the MDSRP funded MIST project with their research effort in the 
Puget Sound region. Her thesis, ―Maritime Domain Awareness and Regulatory Clutter,‖ 
a direct result of her work with MIST, was briefed at the July 2011 monthly MDSRP 
meeting and then forwarded on to national level MDP stakeholders for review. After 
earning her MPP degree in May 2010, Ms. Englehorn has stayed on with NPS as a 
Research Associate with the National Security Institute. 
Ms. Rebecca Law, the third and final Panetta Institute intern with MDSRP, started 
her work supporting the curriculum development efforts for the International Maritime 
Security courses in late 2009. The policy recommendations in her thesis addressing the 
root causes of contemporary piracy, ―Maritime Piracy off the Coast of Somalia,‖ have 
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now been incorporated into the MOVES Institute‘s MMOWGLI  project (see report 
section II:A:19), an experiment in generating collective intelligence. 
POCs: Jeff Kline (jekline@nps.edu) and Martha Diehl (mpp@csumb.edu)  
6. Port Security Visit, Oakland CA 
In late 2004, members of the MDP-RG ventured to the port facility in 
Oakland, California, for a day-long visit. Students from the NPS SEA curriculum and 
California State University, Monterey Bay (CSUMB) participated. The focus of the site 
visit was port security and protection of the vital intermodal transportation system that 
ties the world together. Students met with representatives from the Port of Oakland CBP, 
and APL (www.apl.com). This event presented an opportunity for students to interact 
with security experts from both government and industry, providing a better 
understanding of the current state of maritime protection, cargo security, and possible 
implications for the DoD.  
This visit was a first step towards creating a framework for future 
information exchange in support of maritime security, MDSRP, and the SEA-7 integrated 
student project (see report section II:A:1:a). The day-long meeting included 
presentations covering a variety of topics, such as detecting weapons of mass destruction, 
working with trade unions, cargo containerization, implementation of radiological 
sensors, real estate laws, and the scrap steel trade. Students also toured the APL container 
yard and a handful of students toured the M/V PRESIDENT GRANT, a 52,000 
deadweight ton American Flag containership.  
POC: Bruce Martin (bruce.martin2@yahoo.com) 
7. Maritime Security Workshops 
The MDSRP program supported faculty and students to participate in an ongoing 
series of workshops with maritime security partners in Singapore. A series of security 
meetings organized by the Temasek Defence Systems Institute (TDSI) in Singapore with 
U.S. partners at NPS, and LLNL, this effort began in 2002 and was carried on by the 
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MDSRP starting in 2004. An annual event, this report only highlights the last four years 
of activity. It is anticipated that this effort will continue on past the close of the MDSRP.  
POCs: Dr. Tom Huynh (thuynh@nps.edu@nps.edu) and Dr. Don Brutzman 
(Brutzman@nps.edu) 
a.  Globalization and Maritime Security Conference, Virginia 2008 
The Cebrowski Institute and NPS hosted the 2008 Globalization and 
Maritime Security Conference in Crystal City, Virginia, 29-31 July 2008, as an 
interdisciplinary research and education Security and Global Effects Initiative. The goal 
of the international conference was to provide a forum for researchers and sponsors to 
share information, research and insights related to globalization and maritime security. 
Divided into two discussion groups, participants attended either the globalization track to 
focus on conflict prevention, globalization systems and leadership in complex 
environments or the maritime security track to discuss global maritime partnership, 
maritime security technologies and port security for the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. 
The conference also featured plenary discussions and collaborative working groups for 
the development of new ideas, future research and follow-on activities. 
Guest speakers for the sixth security workshop included the Vice Chief of 
Naval Operations Adm. Patrick Walsh, who delivered the conference keynote speech, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Gregory Gross, Cynthia Irmer of the Department 
of State, Rear Adm. Lee Metcalf of the Office of Global Maritime Situational Awareness 
(OGMSA), Maj. Gen. Herbert Altshuler of U.S. Africa Command, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense Donald Loren, Senator Gary Hart, Brig. Gen. Tan Yih San of the 
Singapore Ministry of Defence, NPS President Dan Oliver and NPS Provost Leonard 
Ferrari. 
Tom Huynh and Don Brutzman, chairmen of the Maritime Security track, 
reported that the Singaporean visitors expressed their pleasure in the success of the 
conference and felt the organization and format were very productive to the collaborative 
process. The Globalization and Maritime Security tracks facilitated and chaired by NPS 
faculty Dan Boger, Karen Guttierri, Don Brutzman, Tom Huynh, Mitch Brown, Peter 
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Walker of Tufts University and Jean Tulley provided a strong structure for the 
collaborative process. The Maritime Security track included discussions of the Straits of 
Malacca and Singapore projects assessing the effectiveness of advanced sensors and 
defensive technology, integrated with existing assets to create higher levels of security. 
The Globalization Track included topics of trends, shocks and prevention and leadership 
development in complex environments. The Singaporean delegates expressed that this 
was the most successful and well organized Globalization and Maritime collaboration 




 Maritime Security Conference, Singapore 2009 
  
The 7th Maritime Security Conference took place in Singapore, 15-17 
July, 2009 as part of a series of security meetings organized by TDSI in Singapore, NPS, 
and LLNL. The objective of this workshop was to solidify collaborative research projects 
in seven key research areas, maritime security being one. The product of this workshop 
was a research plan detailing specific research projects related to those research areas, 




 Maritime Security Conference, Monterey 2010 
In April 2010, NPS hosted the 8th Maritime Security Conference near the 
Monterey campus. Visiting Singaporean attendees included representatives from the 
Ministry of Defence (MINDEF), the Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA), 
the Singapore-MIT Alliance for Research and Technology, the S. Rajaratnam School for 
International Studies, and the National University of Singapore (NUS) from both TDSI 
and the Mechanical Engineering School. Joining several NPS researchers from a variety 
of departments were representatives from LLNL, the University of Wisconsin at 
Madison, and ONR Global. Presentations on featured research included: 
 Maritime security in a mine warfare environment 
 Maritime security in an unmanned/remotely piloted environment 
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 Maritime security using autonomous vehicles 
 Hyperspectral imagery analysis using spatially rectified data 
 Streaming hyperspectral imagery analysis 
 Hyperspectral image analysis to locate targets that are not spatially resolved 
(or resolvable 
 Defense against ―Ship as a Weapon‖ (SAW) 
 SoS approach to exploiting knowledge of atmospheric and ocean surface 
impacts for maritime defense and security 
 Multilayer functional composites for personnel protection against IEDs 
 A multilevel secure device for transient tactical access to sensitive information 
 Architecting of netted sensors for persistent surveillance under uncertainty 
 This full three day event included a site visit to NPS‘s experimentation 
site at Camp Roberts, a tour of NPS campus resources and meetings with key personnel, 
as well as group social and dinner events.  
d.  9
th
 Maritime Security Conference, Singapore 2011 
Held on the NUS campus in July 2011, the 9th Maritime Security 
Conference was jointly organized by TDSI, NPS, and LLNL. The ninth in a series of 
annual meetings, this workshop focused on four primary research areas: 
1) Unmanned technology 
2) Sense-making 
3) Cyber security, and  
4) Maritime security 
The objective of the workshop was to solidify collaborative research 
projects in these four research areas between all participants. The product of this 
workshop was a research plan, containing related research projects, identified researchers 
to collaborate on the specific projects, and plans for how to proceed. The approach used 
in the workshop to achieve the stated objective involved conducting parallel track 
meetings corresponding to the primary research areas. For each track, participants held 
brainstorming discussions using a template distributed in advance to capture ideas, then 
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turn the discussions to the specific research areas. Leadership of the participating 
institutions were provided an opportunity during the workshop proceedings to share 
feedback, facilitating collaborative proposal development. 
This two day event included several keynote addresses by prominent 
SMEs in the research areas selected, project updates on featured research, and a full 
group dinner. Attendees included representatives from Nanyang Technical University 
(NTU), NUS, NPS, DSTA, MINDEF, DSO National Laboratories, the Government of 
Israel, LLNL, ONR Global, ONR USN, the Institute of High Performance Computing 
(IHPC), the CNA Institute for Public Research, the Singapore University of Technology 
and Design (SUTD), and the NMIC. 
8. Project Looking Glass 
The MDSRP sponsored NPS participation in the January 2005 ASD(HD) war 
game ―Project Looking Glass,‖ an interagency game billed as a Maritime Homeland 
Security/Homeland Defense war gaming exercise.  The resulting analysis of the various 
linkages was intended to focus future MDA efforts.  Combining link analysis with 
dynamic steps and feedback was identified as a likely next step. Anticipated results were 
provided to appropriate commands, agencies and enterprises for requirements and policy 
generation as well as offensive and defensive implications and considerations.  
9. Requirements, Capabilities, and Technology (RCT) Forum, May 2005 
The USCG‘s MDS Program Integration Office and the MDSRP hosted a 
Requirements, Capabilities and Technology (RCT) Forum on 2 May 2005 at the Santa 
Clara, California, Convention Center. The RCT Forum was a preliminary event to the 
four-day Coast Guard Innovation Exposition. The purpose of the Forum was to foster 
focused exploration of potential technological solutions to the evolving MDA 
requirements and address the capabilities needed to meet those requirements. Attendees 
participated in in-depth discussions regarding MDA related technological developments 
with subject matter experts from industry and academic organizations, as well as 
members of the DHS and the USCG. The RCT Forum commenced with a general session 
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to acquaint attendees with the current state of MDA requirements, plans, and programs, 
followed by seven concurrent seminars on the following topics: 
 Long range (beyond line of sight (LOS)) sensors 
 Short range (LOS) sensors 
 Data fusion 
 Data mining/anomaly detection (automated tools) 
 Display and decision assistance systems 
 Total system planning/engineering/integration 
 Unconventional platforms (lighter-than-air (LTA), buoys, etc.) 
The results of the National MDA Technology Working Group were also briefed 
as a point of departure for future discussion and research efforts.  
10. MISRAD Leadership Summit, February 2005 
A Maritime ISR and Detection (MISRAD) Leadership Summit was held at NPS 
on 23-24 February 2005. Cost estimation was one of the many important topics covered 
during this event. In response to a high level of interest, the ―Improving Cost Estimates 
for Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations‖ brief was made available the greater 
MDSRP community through an online portal.   Topics covered in the brief included: 
objectives and assumptions; why credible cost estimates are important; cost estimating in 
the acquisition processes; and recommendations. 
The brief was presented by Dr. Daniel A. Nussbaum of the NPS Department of 
Operations Research.  
POC: Dr. Daniel Nussbaum (danussba@nps.edu)  
11. MDA Executive Interagency Workshop, October 2007 
On 25 and 26 October 2007, the MDSRP hosted an executive interagency and 
industry workshop to review the most pressing issues related to maritime security and 
achieving MDA vision and goals. Senior executives from DHS, DoD, USCG, Navy 
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Strategic Studies Group (SSG), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), DOT, the 
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), industry and the 
Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) met to highlight outstanding research issues related to 
achieving goals in MDA and maritime security. The results of this workshop were 
intended to shape the focus of the CNO‘s Distinguished Fellows program and maritime 
defense and security research programs in the National Security Institute. 
POC:  Jeff Kline (jekline@nps.edu)  
C. EXPERIMENTATION 
In a symbiotic relationship with applied research and graduate education, 
experimentation allows at sea and field testing of new concepts, technologies, and 
procedures. The MDSRP sponsored faculty and student participation in a variety of 
maritime security experiments across the globe. 
1. Coalition Operating Area Surveillance and Targeting System 
(COASTS) 
The goal of the Coalition Operating Area Surveillance and Targeting System 
(COASTS) project was to create a mobile field test bed environment for research and 
development, integration, operational testing, and field validation using unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs), manned and unmanned air/ground/water sensors (i.e. soldiers equipped 
with handheld technology), and emerging wireless network technologies to display 
Command and Control information to a local/remote/global or mobile tactical and 
network operations center (see Figure 23).  
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Figure 23: Coalition Operating Area Surveillance and Targeting System (COASTS) 
In 2006 the program name was changed to the Cooperative Operations and 
Applied Science and Technology Studies (COASTS) as it evolved into a large-scale 
international field experimentation program to develop and assess leading edge 
technologies for specific military, peacekeeping and stability operations, law 
enforcement, and first responder missions. COASTS engaged international and domestic 
partners at the research and development level through cooperative science and 
technology field experimentation to investigate and match participant mission needs with 
integrated command and control, computers, communications, intelligence, surveillance 
and reconnaissance (C4ISR) solutions in domestic, bilateral and multi-national 
environments. Since its inception, the COASTS program has been a contributing partner 
to MDP research at NPS, with students conducting award winning research and 
participation in exercises Talisman Saber and SEACAT, along with its own field research 
events. This research allowed U.S. military commands, including NPS, to collaborate 
with coalition partners and allies to support Global War on Terror (GWOT) objectives 
and operational and security requirements, using the latest wireless networking 
technologies, tools, tactics, and techniques. NPS and Thailand were the initial team 
members that integrated the proposed equipment and technology into a system to 
facilitate surveillance and monitoring of ―areas of interest.‖  
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The COASTS program experimented with individual and small unit network-
capable communication and threat warning technologies, most of which are commercial-
off-the-shelf.  The COASTS topology used an open, plug-and-play architecture that is 
user-configurable. This enabled U.S. and coalition partners to implement a common 
operating picture – situational awareness – via a self-forming, self-authenticating, 
autonomous network. 
 
MDP-RG Researchers Reconnect Tsunami Survivors to the World 
 
A survivors' camp and nearby grave registration center/morgue in the Thailand 
coastal areas hardest hit by the 26 December 2004 tsunami were reconnected 
to the world only days after the disaster thanks to a fly-in wireless network 
team from the Naval Postgraduate School.  Information Systems Department 
faculty member and MDP-RG member Brian Steckler headed the Coalition 
Operating Area Surveillance and Targeting System field experimentation 
research group that set up wireless networks. This work successfully 
established internet connectivity between a refugee camp near a resort area 
two hours north of Phuket, Thailand (Khao Lok), and a Bhuddist Temple 
repurposed into the grave registration center and morgue in the nearby fishing 
village of Takua Pa.  
 
The COASTS program directly supported organizing, training, and equipping 
U.S. military forces and the Thailand Defense Forces in seven principal mission areas: 1) 
Direct Action; 2) Tactical Reconnaissance; 3) Foreign Internal Defense; 4) Combating 
Terrorism; 5) Civil Affairs; 6) Counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; 
and 7) Information Operations.  
The program set out to address three primary concerns:  
1) Does COASTS provide threat warning information as part of a wireless 
LAN/WAN?  
2) Does COASTS meet performance requirements when deployed to Thailand 
(ground/jungle scenario - such as the 2500 kilometer Thailand/Myanmar 
border region)?  
3) Does COASTS meet performance requirements when deployed to Singapore 
(water scenario - such as Straits of Malacca and/or Singapore Straits)?  
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The COASTS program also provided student thesis, research and development 
field testing, and exercise program opportunities in the following areas: 
 Wireless mesh network and wireless long haul broadband communications 
 Enhanced situational awareness and 3D common operational picture 
 Advanced ISR systems 
 Unmanned vehicles – unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and maritime 
mini-UAVs 
 Wearable computing devices for maritime interdiction operations (MIO)/ 
extended maritime interdiction operations (EMIO) 
 Handheld biometric devices and biometric reachback 
 Handheld chemical, biological, and/or nuclear sensing devices 
This experimentation project provided opportunities in the following operational 
areas of interest: 
 MIO/EMIO 
 Riverine patrol and security 
 Counter-drug smuggling, terrorism operations, and transnational crime 
 Improved MDA 
 Key project events identified by the research team were: 
 Contiguous U.S. field tests every November, January, and March from 
2005 to 2009 
 Thailand field tests every May and June from 2005 to 2009 
 Fleet exercise demonstrations (SEACAT) June 2006-2008 
 COBRA GOLD, 2008-2009 
The benefits to the warfighter from this experimentation project were many. The 
multinational information sharing allowed analysis of essential communications channels 
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and processes. Research into Hastily Formed Networks (HFN) to provide flexibility, 
durability and scalability in adverse environmental conditions spawned new research 
projects into this essential use of communications technology in the field (see report 
section II:C:3). Benefits of this project also included real-time, net-centric information 
management for improved situational awareness at local and remote C2 nodes (target 
identification, battle damage assessment (BDA), etc.) and expanded warfighter 
capabilities. Evaluation of consumer off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies within a system-
of-systems, security analysis and penetration testing by a Red Cell, and enhanced bi-
directional high-bandwidth information sharing for boarding operations were all of 
additional benefit to the warfighter. 
Milestones to fielding capability were identified as: 1) incorporate COASTS-
05/06/07 Lessons Learned into COASTS-08 plans; 2) complete a system and subsystem 
analysis and evaluation for military and law enforcement utility; 3) develop a preliminary 
CONOPS, TTPs and lessons learned; 4) demonstrate successful employment of real-
world high payoff systems and technologies; and 5) conduct operationally focused 
research with experienced military personnel with a short development-to-testing-to-
deployment timeline, approximately one to two years. 
Key deliverables each year from 2005 to 2009 were 1) a COASTS Technology 
Demonstrations to VIPs every year in June, 2) the COASTS After Action and System 
Evaluation reports (available upon request), 3) individual Technology Assessments as 
part of the After Action Review process, 4) the preliminary CONOPS and TTPs produced 
and available each year as part of the COASTS team documentation process, and 5) 
deployment of employment-ready technologies and Fly-Away Kits (FLAKs). These 
FLAKs were then used in further experimentation with the build-on Hastily Formed 
Networks (HFNs) project in 2006 and 2007. 
Organizations partnering with the MDSRP in this project included: Commander 
U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMPACFLT) and USPACOM, Office of the Secretary of Defense 
for Homeland Defense, USCG, ONR Navy Reserve Program, Royal Thai Armed Forces 
(RTArF). Commercial contractors and vendors included Cisco Systems, Mercury Data 
Systems, Rajant Corporation, CyberDefense Systems, Redline Communications, and 
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INTER-4. The NPS COASTS team was led by Research Associate James Ehlert and 
Lecturer Ed Fisher. 
POC: Research Associate James Ehlert (jfehlert@nps.edu)  
a. COASTS 2008 
In FY08, the COASTS international field experimentation team, 
consisting of over thirty members representing NPS faculty and students, ONR reservists, 
and industry representatives, completed a successful two-week field experimentation in 
partnership with the RTAF at Ao Manao Air Base in South-Central Thailand. ―The 
COASTS 2008 International Field Experimentation Team is experiencing wonderful 
R&D synergy with the Royal Thai Armed Forces via its veteran partners such as the 
Defense Science and Technology Organization and the Royal Thai Air Force, but also 
with the inclusion of several new partners such as the Royal Thai Navy Research and 
Development Office, the Royal Thai Navy surface fleet, and the Royal Thai Navy 
SEALS,‖ said NPS Information Sciences Research Associate James Ehlert, COASTS 
Program Manager. ―The opportunity for collaborative project and inter-operability 
exchange between the Royal Thai Armed Forces and the Naval Postgraduate School has 
never been better.‖ 
 
Figure 24. ENS Chris McCook and the Thai-US Security Team apprehends the scenario RED team 
and collects biometrics data 
 
The completed Field Experiment (FEX) IV at the Royal Thai Air Force 
(RTAF) Base in Ao Manao, Prachuap Khiri Khan province, brought the U.S.-based 
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COASTS infrastructure employed in FEXs I, II and III at Camp Roberts, California, into 
the challenging environment of Central Thailand. FEX-IV also integrated the COASTS 
Thai partners including officers and enlisted personnel from the RTAF and the Royal 
Thai Navy (RTN) (see Figure 24). FEX-IV featured the first time integration of an RTN 
Fast Patrol Craft in the COASTS architecture. The COASTS-08 Scenario features a 
combined Thai-US Team operating jointly in three scenario phases: (1) a Humanitarian 
Assistance/ Disaster Relief phase, (2) a Force Protection/ Base Security phase, and (3) an 
Oil Pipeline Security/ Maritime Interdiction Operations phase. 
In the first phase, a combined Thai/U.S. force responded to a simulated 
tsunami event in southern Thailand, much like the actual 2006 tsunami disaster. Ground 
forces, manned and unmanned air assets and the RTN patrol craft arrived on scene to 
provide real-time C4ISR capabilities via a hastily formed network. In the second phase, a 
red-team attack on an Ao Manao Air Base, COASTS sensors detected the attack and 
provided situation awareness to local and remote command nodes which prompted the 
deployment of combined Thai/ U.S. security teams. These sensors were all connected via 
the COASTS network consisting of a variety of cutting-edge wireless communications 
technologies protected by advanced network security systems. 
In the third phase, an attack on a simulated oil pipeline, the COASTS 
sensors detected the attack allowing command authorities to order a combined Thai/U.S. 
special operations force to be launched from the RTN patrol craft resulting in 
apprehension of the terrorists before the pipeline could be damaged. The RTN patrol craft 
then conducted a boarding of the attacking Red Team vessel launching the attack while 




Figure 25. Royal Thai Air Force airman’s biometrics collected 
In Phases 2 and 3, all apprehended ―suspects‖ had their biometrics data 
collected, including fingerprints, iris and face scans (see Figure 25), and sent in real time 
to the Biometrics Fusion Center (BFC) in the U.S. Biometrics matches were made by the 
BFC against previously loaded data resulting in positive identification of high value 
suspects in less than five minutes from collection to having the answer on scene. ―The 
COASTS surveillance network was able to provide immediate situation awareness to 
remote decision makers over an area which previously had no surveillance coverage,‖ 
said CAPT Paul Marshall who heads the ONR Reserve Team. ―A remarkable aspect of 
this capability was that it was set up from scratch in days. The hastily formed, deployable 
aspect of the C4ISR architecture makes it applicable to modern warfare scenarios.‖ Air 
Vice Marshall Wanchai from the Thai Defense Science and Technology Office (DSTO) 
added, ―The COASTS program is just the right fit and size for the Defense Science & 
Technology Office to participate and to undertake joint research efforts. It has a 
successful blend of commercial and military applications without the overhead of other 
international engagements. We are very excited to expand our involvement for FEX V 
and for COASTS 2009.‖  
POC: Research Associate James Ehlert (jfehlert@nps.edu)  
b. COASTS 2009 
 
December 2008 was an interesting month especially in light of the protest 
by the People‘s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) at the Bangkok International Airport and 
the subsequent closure of the Bangkok International Airport itself. The Scenario 
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Development Conference was postponed until 16-20 February, and ultimately combined 
with the Initial Planning Conference. Nonetheless, COASTS team members happened to 
be in the Kingdom of Thailand on leave/vacation an managed to meet and conduct 
business with US and Thai counterparts. In addition, the ―in-country‖ team members 
visited the Thai police checkpoint – Nakhon Sawan – and adjusted the upcoming 
installation of the License Plate Recognition (LPR) system scheduled for a February 2009 
installation. Also, the COASTS program continued to seek an operational sponsor and to 
that end had initial discussions with the U.S. Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) 
Experimentation Center (MEC) to potentially move the COASTS headquarters to Oahu, 
Hawaii, on 1 August 2009 in alignment with MARFORPAC research and development 
goals for the Pacific Theater.  
The Commanding Officer of the USCG Monterey Bay approved a 
COASTS multi-system installation to function as a ―live‖ test-bed for further 
experimentation and research and development efforts. This installation includes the 
Kestrel Technology Group license plate recognition system, the Lockheed Martin facial 
recognition system, and the Savi Inc. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) system, all 
scheduled for an early January deployment and ultimate integration with the COASTS 
global network. 
POC: Research Associate James Ehlert (jfehlert@nps.edu)  
c. Consolidation with U.S. Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) 
Experimentation Center (MEC) 
In mid 2009 it became apparent that the programmatic objectives of the 
MEC and COASTS had converged and aligned to the point where a consolidation of the 
two efforts was warranted. This transition ultimately provided greater value to program 
participants by: 1) focusing resources on technologies to support the warfighter, theater 
security cooperation, and science and technology objectives; and 2) aligning all PACOM 
experimentation efforts to leverage reduce resource costs, and provide increased return on 
investments. USPACOM approved the initiation of a new experimentation test-bed called 
the CRIMSON exercise series. CRIMSON VIPER was the first iteration of this new field 
experimentation venue, and occurred in Thailand in July 2009. This experimentation 
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served as a gateway for technology insertion into exercise COBRA GOLD. The 
executive agent for CRIMSON VIPER was the MEC and the event supported both 
USPACOM and RTArF science and technology requirements. CRIMSON VIPER 
experiments and associate technologies were dictated by the results of the exercise 
COBRA GOL Technology Insertion Workshop process. All candidate technologies are 
evaluated and assessed in CRIMSON VIPER at one of three levels: 
1) Static Display – non- operational showcasing of Systems 
2) Demonstration – an event where the primary purpose is to 
demonstrate an emerging technology with no formal assessment 
conducted 
3) Assessment – an event where a range of evaluation is being 
conducted 
These categories align directly with, and in all cases support, exercise 
COBRA GOLD experimentation initiatives. CRIMSON VIPER benefits from the 
MEC/COASTS model synergies and increases the delivery of short development cycle 
capabilities and solutions driven by the warfighting community. This transformation of 
the COASTS program provides even greater value to NPS and U.S. program participants 
while serving to focus resources on the best technologies with the most chance of 
supporting the warfighter. 
POC: Research Associate James Ehlert (jfehlert@nps.edu)  
2. Field Information Support Tool (FISTS)  
The Field Information Support Tool (FIST) is a field based collection system 
using COTS smart phones, customized software, and a robust information management 
backend known as FusionPortal with a deployable sensor fusion system known as 
FusionView that enables information to flow from the point of capture to an analyst in 
near real-time regardless of location or physical proximity (see Figure 26).  
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Figure 26. Field information support tool (FIST) Fusion View example 
The concept of FIST originated with Capt Carrick Longley, USMC, and CW3 Chad 
Machiela, USA, while both were students at NPS.  FIST is designed to operate in a 
variety of environments and supports a variety of mission sets such as counterinsurgency 
operations (COIN), counter-narcotics missions (CN), and humanitarian assistance and 
disaster response (HA/DR).  
FIST is divided into three separate components that comprise the system.  The 
field collection tool is known simply as Gather, the web-based information management 
portal is known as FusionPortal, and the analysis, sensor fusion and visualization system 
is known as FusionView. The overarching principle of FIST is the development of a user-
friendly data collection tool that utilizes automated information systems to enable 
unstructured data to be collected, processed, and structured for analysis and visualization 
in a variety of analytic packages. FusionView enables real-time integration of disparate 
sensor systems that provides a powerful common operating picture critical for today's 
decision makers. FusionPortal allows for data to be exported and analyzed using 
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geospatial, geo-statistical, temporal, link, and social network analysis in addition to 
enabling the exchange of information with external databases such as the All Partners 
Area Network (APAN). 
 
Figure 27. CARAT 2010 team aboard the HTMS Naresuan, Sattahip Naval Base, Thailand 
In FY10 the NPS FIST team deployed to Sattahip Naval Base in Thailand from 
13-21 May to participate in exercise Cooperation and Readiness Afloat Training 
(CARAT) 2010 (see Figure 27). The NPS team consisted of Mr. James Ehlert, Mr. Ed 
Fisher, and Capt Carrick Longley. Additionally, Mr. Ivan Cardenas of Kestrel 
Technology Group and Mr. Cyril Berg, Mr. Paul Trist, and Mr. Aaron Aamold of 
AeroVironment were also integrated with the NPS team. The combined team was tasked 
with demonstrating smartphone data management, information fusion and UAV 
technology respectively. Using the AeroVironment Puma AE unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV), the NPS team was able to demonstrate an integrated HA/DR and reconnaissance 
platform using low cost communications solutions. The PUMA AE was also combined 
with UHF data radios for communication relay capability trials. The trials are a first stage 
evaluation for meeting the requirements being developed by 31st MEU under III-MEF 
for OTH VHF/UHF communications relays using expeditiously deployed UAV platforms 
for extended periods. The OTH horizon trials were successfully accomplished as well as 
demonstration of the strong tactical capabilities of the system. Land and sea launch and 
recovery operations of the relay equipped aircraft were demonstrated in various 
combinations as well as communications relay and site reconnaissance support of the 
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main exercise event, the amphibious landing. In addition to the tests, several flag officers 
from the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTArF) were briefed on FIST and its application for 
Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Response (HA/DR). Rear Admiral Tyson of CTF-73 
was also briefed. FIST was well received by all and invitations from the RTArF for future 
FIST demonstrations are forthcoming. 
Other FIST initiatives include FIST Armed Forces of the Philippines (FIST AFP), 
FIST Nepal (FIST NEP), FIST Singapore (FIST SIN), FIST Pandemic Influenza (FIST 
PI), FIST U.S. Census Bureau, and FIST USAID. Further information on any and all of 
these initiatives is available upon request. Seeded with MDSRP resources, current project 
sponsors include USPACOM, Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC), and 
Counter-Narcoterrorism Technology Program Office. Project partners include a wide 
range of representatives from international government, academia, and industry.  
POC: Research Associate James Ehlert (jfehlert@nps.edu)  
3. Hastily Formed Network Experiments and Humanitarian Missions  
Immediately after the December 2004 tsunami off Banda Aceh, NPS deployed 
faculty and students on the coastline of Thailand with Information and Communications 
Technology (ICT) equipment in support of the international response to the devastating 
tsunami.  The NPS Hastily Formed Networks (HFN) team has also deployed with 
equipment and expertise to support DoD in Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and most recently 
the Haiti earthquake of 2010.  They have also supported major Pacific region exercises 




Figure 28:  Hastily Formed Networks humanitarian assistance work 
The NPS HFN research group uses real-world events and exercises like these to show the 
art of the possible with rapidly deployed communications and continues to be innovative 
leveraging very portable/mobile ICT and information sharing applications in HA/DR 
missions.   
Current NPS research now includes integration of push-to-talk radio 
communications, fossil fuel alternative power sources (solar, wind, etc.), and viable 
software applications for HR/DR efforts. Objectives of this HFN experimentation were 
many-fold, but primarily centered around demonstrating and operating HFNs portable 
and mobile technologies: 
 802.11 WiFi, 802.16 WiMAX, Broadband VSAT satellite internet reachback, and 
Voice Over IP 
 Communications technologies integrated as prototypes to create 
COMMUNICATIONS, VISUALIZATION, ALTERNATE POWER and 
NETWORK OPERATION CENTER Fly-away Kits (FLAKs) 
Benefits to operations articulated by the project team were numerous. NPS 
deployed HFNs gear and FLAKs in several locations while their host ships performed 
humanitarian missions. The project provided opportunity to both learn from and 
demonstrate the utility of challenges and options possible with HFNs in remote areas of 
 85 
the world. Patient tracking system experiments with the Defense Manpower Data Center 
(DMDC)/OSD were also of operational benefit. 
Milestones to fielding capability identified by the research team were the setup of 
similar NPS support for a planned USS FT. MCHENRY outreach mission to Western 
Africa (Gulf of Guinea), and NPS coordination with NETWARCOM, Fleet Forces 
Command, and others on frequency spectrum issues with gear radiating from the ship at 
these foreign ports. Key deliverables were a field demonstration and CONOPS.  
Sponsored in part by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and 
Information Integration (ASD(NII)), total funds required for this NPS HFN work was 
well over $2 M between FY‘s 2007 and 2011.  Primary research sponsors have been DHS 
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense with student participation sponsored by the 
MDSRP.   This experimentation project was led by NPS Professor Brian Steckler. 
POC: Professor Brian Steckler (steckler@nps.edu)  
4. Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO)  
The overall goal of these studies was to provide planners, commanders and field 
personnel involved in marine interdiction operations and other related missions with 
guidance on how the environment affects operations. All physical environmental effects 
such as weather, visibility and sea state were considered, with emphasis on atmospheric 
effects on target detection (both radar and visible), communications systems, jamming 
systems and weapon performance.  
The maritime interdiction operation (MIO) projects are ongoing, and have 
involved many efforts over time. A representative sample of MIO efforts supported in 
full or part by the MDSRP are included in this report. More information on any and all 
MIO projects are available upon request. 
POC: Dr. Alex Bordetsky (abordets@nps.edu)  
a. MIO 08-2 
The MIO 08-2 experiment introduced several unique new elements, 
including tagging and global monitoring of suspect vehicle, multiple small drive-by 
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detection and data sharing between the boarding party searching large vessel under the 
deck and Riverine area stand-of detection. 
 
Figure 29. MIO 08-2 receiving SA tracks, video, and biometrics data feeds from the overseas sites 
(Sweden) 
 
The monitoring phase unfolded in Europe. It began with tagging a 
―suspicious‖ car at the simulated border control check point in the Bavarian Alps, 
including biometrics identification (see Figure 29) and nuclear radiation source detection 
on board the vehicle. The original goal was for the expert teams at Lawrence Livermore 
National Lab (LLNL) to immediately engage in the analysis of source/crew data 
interactions and develop rapid situational understanding by means of real-time 
collaboration with the check point cell, comprised of the small command post at the 
University of Bundeswhr (UoB), Munich, and the mobile check point 30 mi South of 
Munich in the Alpine area. 
The critical new goal was to tag the vehicle and keep monitoring its 
movement through Germany to Poland and on to the ferry heading towards Sweden. The 
Swedish Naval Warfare Center (SNWC) MIO team in Sweden and the command post in 
Munich would be addressing the challenge of continuing monitoring, by resolving the 
difficulties via the TNT MIO Operations Center at the NPS CENETIX in Monterey. The 
LLNL group was able to communicate data with the watch officer in Livermore and 
communicate the results back to the check point. The UoB command post successfully 
used NPS situational awareness tools for monitoring, while the NSWC was also 
combining it with the SNWC (Sweden)/KOCKUMS Blue Force tracker. 
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Figure 30. MIO 08-2 small craft detection and interdiction in progress 
The objective for the interdiction and search phase was to explore the 
feasibility and major constraints associated with collaboration, data sharing between 
boarding parties engaged and the ability of command centers to come up with the scale of 
threat imposed by multiple small craft penetrating the metropolitan area (see Figure 30). 
Combined self-aligning orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (SAOFDM) and the 
wave relay network delivered drive-by detection of eight suspect vessels simultaneously. 
In general, the MIO 08-2 appeared to be a significant step forward. It 
produced vital results for tagging and monitoring, allowed the most successful 
identification of drive-by CONOPS, demonstrated excellent performance of wave relay 
platform and satellite point-to-point reach back solutions (Swe-Dish, Tachyon), produced 
good results at different commands and provided for expert site collaboration. 
POC: Dr. Alex Bordetsky (abordets@nps.edu)  
b. MIO 08-4 
The MIO 08-4 experiment was a significant next step in   evaluating the 
use of networks, advanced sensors, and collaborative technology for rapid MIO, 
including the ability to search for radiation sources, set up ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore 
communications while maintaining network connectivity with C2 organizations, and 
regional-scale collaboration. The specific goal for the MIO 08-4 experiment was to 
explore new sensor, networking, and situational awareness solutions for interdicting, 
searching, tagging, and monitoring large vessel as well as small craft, threatening the 
security of the coastal metropolitan areas on the scale of the radiological threat in the Port 
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of New York and New Jersey and subsequent events in the Riverine area of Hampton 
Roads, Virginia (see Figure 31).  
 
Figure 31. MIO 08-4 dislocation of command post and target ship at berth 17 (Phase I, Day 1) and 
two small target vessels (Phase II, Day 2) 
 
The situational awareness focus of the experiment was to explore the 
requirements for broad interagency collaboration and data sharing using the capabilities 
of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ) joint C2 Joint Analysis 
Center (JAC) feedback, and two-way data sharing with the Riverine Area of operation. 
Correspondingly, the TNT MIO 08-4 experiment was structured as four day event 
sequence.  During the first two days interdiction and threat response activities were 
taking place in the Port of New York and New Jersey area with complementary data 
feeds from the early warning sites in Europe.  Upon interdicting, searching, and tagging 
the suspect small vessel, the experiment activities for the next two days were moved to 
the Riverine area of operation nearby Ft. Eustis at Hampton Roads, Virginia 
POC: Dr. Alex Bordetsky (abordets@nps.edu)  
b.  TNT MIO, 2010 
During FY10, Dr. Guest, in the role of Principal Investigator, participated 
in two TNT MIO experiments. These were a continuation of a series of field programs 
directed by Dr. Alex Bordetsky, NPS. The principal investigator provided weather 
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forecasts each morning of these operations, keying on those features that were most likely 
to affect operations. Major weather impacts were high winds and rough sea state 
conditions during the April, 2010 field program in the estuary near Ft. Eustis, VA and a 
series of thunderstorms which affected operations for the program in Germany in June. 
In addition to providing traditional weather guidance for TNT operations, 
in FY 2010 the principal investigator also performed studies of how the environment 
affects target detection in harbor areas using both radio (radar) and visible and IR 
imaging systems. Most notable was the performance of the Panama City Near Earth 
Propagation Test in August, 2009. This experiment involved precise quantification of 
low level short range radio signals – such as those used to detect mines or triggering 
devices – in conjunction with detailed measurements of the near-surface atmospheric 
properties. Although there were significant variations in signal strength it was difficult to 
relate these to specific environmental factors at very close (73 m) ranges. The most 
important factors were the elevation of the radio receivers and transmitters. It was found 
that signal strength was proportional to the fourth power of path elevation, and lower 
paths were more strongly affected by negative interference from surface reflections. 
POC: Dr. Peter Guest (pguest@nps.edu)  
c. NPS-LLNL MIO 2011: Searching, Tracking, and Interdicting 
Cargo Ships and Multiple Small Craft Possessing Nuclear 
Radiation Threat 
MIO 2011 experimentation goals included: 
1) The application of USVs to small craft screening and pursuit;  
2) Collaboration between U.S. experts and overseas operators on 
network-controlled choke point setup, drive-by primary and secondary 
screening, stand-off detection at high-speed pursuit (Singapore, Souda 
Bay-Greece);  
3) The application of UAV and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to the 
combined search of cargo vessel and small vessel detection via 
cooperative UAV-UGV (cargo vessel) and USV small craft detection;  
4) network-enabled swimmer detection of small craft-sourced threat at 
the overseas POE (Singapore, Souda Bay); and  
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5) Ground tracking of illicit material transfer to port security areas in 
Singapore and U.S. military sites overseas (see Figure 32). 
 
Figure 32. Globally distributed tagging, tracking, and search experimentation 
 
Network Controlled Nuclear Radiation Detection: 
 Small craft drive-by detection at high speed 
 ARAM – Adaptable Radiation Area Monitor used for Drive-by detection 
 Choke point (portal) detection operational model 
 Stand-off  mesh network-controlled detection 
 Multiple small craft search and interdiction 
 Network-controlled unmanned surface vessels 
 Tactical broadband wireless, cellular, satellite, and UWB network 
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Figure 33. NPS-LLNL MIO 2011 
This series of experiments (see Figure 33) is ongoing. 
POC: Dr. Alex Bordetsky (abordets@nps.edu) 
5. USSOCOM-NPS Field Experimentation (FEX) Cooperative – 
Maritime Security Component  
The key objective of this program was to evaluate the use of networks, advanced 
sensors, and collaborative technology for rapid MIO, port security, and riverine 
operations; e.g. for MIO, the ability for a boarding party to rapidly set up ship-to-ship 
communications that permit them to search for a radiation and explosive sources and 
collect biometrics while maintaining network connectivity with C2 organizations, and 
collaborating with remotely located sensor experts, coalition partners, and first 
responders (see Figure 34). 
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Figure 34. USSOCOM-NPS Field Experimentation Cooperative maritime security component 
In partnership with the USSOCOM, NPS conducted the second quarter FY08 
FEX during three different time periods: 1) San Clemente Island from 4-6 February 2008; 
2) Camp Roberts, CA, Camp Dawson, WV, and Camp Atterbury, Indiana from 23-29 
February 2008; and 3) San Francisco Bay area (including a European component from 3-
7 March 2008) from 10-13 March 2008.  The primary objectives of the FEX Cooperative 
Program were to maintain and utilize a full spectrum experimentation capability for 
providing high value assessments to concept development and Component Master Plans, 
to provide an independent assessment capability to evaluate effectiveness, affordability, 
and feasibility of future capabilities, and to provide a unique education and research 
environment for students and faculty at NPS.   
Secondary objectives included examining dual-use capabilities for homeland 
security, stabilization, reconstruction, and disaster relief/humanitarian assistance, and for 
other government agencies.  This ongoing experimentation project accomplishes these 
objectives by providing a unique field experiment venue quarterly in which innovation 
and collaboration are encouraged between DoD, government agencies, industry, and 
universities, and in which Special Operations Force (SOF) operator participation and 
feedback are utilized.  Major focus was placed on network communications, unmanned 
systems, airspace management and deconfliction, situational awareness, collaborative 
environments, sensors, biometrics, and human systems integration.   
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The Camp Roberts/Fort Hunter Liggett/Camp Atterbury/Camp Dawson portion 
focused on urban and rural terrain whereas the San Francisco Bay/European experiments 
focus on maritime interdiction operations, port security, and riverine operations.  The 
MDSRP supported faculty and student participation in these experiments. Major 
emphasis at Camp Roberts was on pre-requirements experimentation and rapid response 
to USSOCOM Component Command requests.  Camp Atterbury emphasis was on 
SOF/First Responder concepts, training and evaluations of newly available technologies 
for near-term utilization.  Emphasis at Camp Dawson was on untethered biometrics 
collection and related communications.  SOKF-J9 was assigned the lead to conduct 
leveraged experiments in cooperation with the NPS TNT Field Experimentation Program.   
A Quick-Look Report that briefly summarizes the most significant results, 
observations and lessons learned for the major experiment areas of focus was published 
at the FOUO level of classification.  Additionally, each individual system, concept, or 
area of focus produced a separate After Action Report specific to their objectives and 
results if a more detailed understanding is desired.   
Example technologies evaluated included: 
 Innovative wireless networks and sensors 
 SATCOM on-the-move and  orbital ad-hoc networking 
 Laser communications 
 Drive-by radiation detection 
 Projectile-based wireless links 
 Networked USVs and UGVs 
 Collaboration and decision making 
 Situational awareness 
 IPv6 
 Environmental effects on target detection, communications, and plume 
dispersion 
 94 
 Forward deployed biometrics with reach-back  
POC: Dr. Alex Bordetsky (abordets@nps.edu)  
6. Seaweb subsurface sensor network for port surveillance and maritime 
domain awareness 
Our national economy and domestic security depend on commerce through our 
seaports. However, port environments are difficult to monitor and are hence inherently 
vulnerable. Seaweb acoustic communications are currently enabling distributed anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) and maritime sensor networks. The research team 
hypothesizes that Seaweb sensor networks are well suited for operations in ports and port 
approaches. Autonomous, distributed, underwater sensors measure environmental 
parameters and detect surface vessels and subsurface intruders (see Figure 35). Seaweb 
acoustic communications enable real-time, wireless data telemetry and C2. 
 
Figure 35. Seaweb’s autonomous, distributed, underwater sensors detecting surface vessel 
In FY08, the MDSRP Seaweb project established a working arrangement with the 
Port of Long Beach and demonstrated through-water acoustic communications in the 
inner port basin. The inner basin network reached through multiple underwater repeater 
nodes to a police boat positioned in the outer basin. The success of this initial testing 
motivated conceptualization of networking concepts applicable to shallow port 




Figure 36. Underwater networked acoustic sensor on the seabed (foreground) detect the passage of a 
surface vessel, and distributed network nodes (background) including a Racom gateway buoy provide 
for near-real-time exfiltration of contact reports. 
In FY09, the MDSRP Seaweb project led a coalition of academic and government 
partners to deploy an acoustic network in San Francisco Bay. The goal of SF Bayweb 
was to field a wireless underwater sensor and communications network within a major 
U.S. port having adverse environmental acoustic conditions. The Navy successfully 
demonstrated Seaweb networking in the Port of Long Beach, CA in 2008 with benign 
environmental conditions. The San Francisco Bay offered a more challenging 
environment with heavy shipping traffic, strong currents, and significant sediment 
transport. During the SF Bayweb experiment, a Seaweb communications network 
delivered environmental sensor data in near-real-time from the subsurface domain to a 
shore-based server. These ocean data served the oceanographic community while 
simultaneously supporting analysis of Seaweb communications performance. SF Bayweb 
2009 was a pilot demonstration of a scalable Seaweb network architecture, with the 
longer-term goal of fielding larger more complex networks, more sophisticated 




Figure 37. The SF Bayweb 2009 network telemetered data from two ADCP current profilers to a 
Racom gateway node integrated on a USCG navigation buoy. 
SF Bayweb 2009 occurred in the vicinity of Angel Island, in the San Francisco 
Bay. Two Acoustic Doppler Current Profiler (ADCP) sensors were deployed to measure 
currents in this area. A Seaweb network composed of five telesonar repeater nodes and 
one radio/acoustic communications (Racom) gateway node telemetered the 
environmental measurement data from the undersea sensors to a gateway node (see 
Figure 37). The gateway node provided the link between the land site via cellular 
telephone modem, and the underwater domain via telesonar modem. The gateway node 










Figure 38. A Racom gateway kit with telesonar acoustic modem and cellular telephone modem 
implemented on a USCG navigation buoy in San Francisco Bay with logistical support by USCG 
cutter GEORGE COBB. 
The components of an oceanographic sensor network well suited for San 
Francisco Bay were developed and demonstrated. SF Bayweb experiences indicate that a 
surveillance network in San Francisco Bay is indeed feasible. It is recommended that the 
equipment developed for these experiments be redeployed in San Francisco Bay at a 
future opportunity with a more ambitious collection of sensor nodes beyond the two 
ADCPs that were included in Bayweb 2009.  
The following organizations participated in the NPS-led SF Bayweb 2009 
experiments: 
 NPS  
 SPAWAR Systems Center Pacific, San Diego 
 USCG District 11, Yerba Buena CA 
 San Francisco State University (SFSU) – Romberg Tiburon Center for 
Environmental Studies 
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 University of California, Berkeley 
 Central and Northern California Ocean Observing System (CeNCOOS), 
Moss Landing CA 
 Monterey Bay Aquarium Research Institute (MBARI), Moss Landing CA 
 University of California, Davis – Bodega Marine Lab, Bodega CA 
In FY10, NPS was prepared to implement and deploy a true maritime surveillance 
network. With funding provided by the ONR Operational Adaptation exercise the team 
fielded a Seaweb network with underwater passive acoustic directional sensors in the 
Intracoastal Waterway at Morehead City, North Carolina, on the U.S. eastern seaboard 
(see Figure 39).  
 
Figure 39. Exercise scenario site (Intracoastal Waterway at Morehead City, North Carolina) involves 
protection of a high-value port facility (blue) against maritime threats (red).  
The experiment objective was to demonstrate capability for first-alert protection of a 
high-value port facility against asymmetric threats that intelligence sources indicate are 
arriving via watercraft. Battery-powered acoustic sensors (see Figure 40) were rapidly 
deployed at widely separated chokepoint locations in shallow 5-10 meter water.  
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Figure 40. The directional acoustic sensor node is deployed on the seabed at a strategic location. 
These sensors autonomously detect the passage of a maritime vessel and generate a 
contact report indicating time, location and heading of the target. Seaweb through-water 
acoustic communications delivered the contact report via a scalable wide-area underwater 
network including multiple acoustic repeater nodes and a Racom gateway buoy. The 
Racom gateway telemetered the contact report via Iridium satellite communications to an 
ashore command center with low latency (see Figure 41). The in situ acoustic detection 




Figure 41. Navigation chart of the Port of Morehead City showing deployed Seaweb network of two 
sensor nodes (white square symbols), six telesonar repeater nodes (white circles) and one Racom 
gateway node with Iridium link (aerial satellite view overlaid at top). 
Statistical analysis of the target opportunities during the three test events shows 
that the acoustic sensors perform well against targets having closest point of approach 
(CPA) within 200 meters. Within this range, the probability of detection is Pd = 0.97 (see 
Figure 42). The time required to report the surveillance contact is typically less than two 
minutes, well within the five minutes required to act upon the alert message. 
Occasionally the reporting latency is protracted because of a communications failure in 
the underwater network requiring retransmission. Seaweb successfully resolved these 
failures using a built-in automatic repeat request (ARQ) protocol. Analysis of recorded 
data revealed that the sensors begin to track contacts at ranges significantly greater than 
the CPA ranges. This is a significant result given the shallow-water environment and 








Figure 42. Statistical analysis of the Seaweb target opportunities; CPA range/events (top), alert 
reporting times (middle), and contacts (bottom) 
 
At the end of January 2009, NPS Seaweb lead Joe Rice chaired a session on 
unmanned sensors at a U.S.-France bilateral MDA working group convening at the 
Pentagon Conference Center in Washington DC. In 2009, NPS Seaweb networking 
integrated autonomous ASW sensors from the U.S., Norway, and Canada operating 
against a cooperative diesel-electric submarine. The NPS Seaweb project has received an 
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increasing amount of support as the project evolves and succeeds. The Seaweb project is 
ongoing, and will continue on past the close of the MDSRP 
POC: Professor Joe Rice (jarice@nps.edu) 
7. Distributed Information Systems Experimentation (DISE) 
The overall objective of the Distributed Information Systems Experimentation 
(DISE) program is to plan and execute large-scale experimentation of new technologies 
and tactics to support the joint warfighter.  
DISE group thesis research has included MDSRP related topics such as: 
1) Examining the effects of placing new and emerging technologies 
developed in Spiral-1 onto legacy systems and how the U.S. Navy as an 
organization will either absorb these technologies or make 
multidimensional changes to enhance the process of achieving MDA, and 
2) Examining the impact of improved extended maritime interdiction 
operations (EMIO) technology designed to bridge together EMIO 
technology designed to bridge data with intelligence collected during 
EMIO and improve maritime domain decision making in terms of speed 
and quality and thus improve end user's situational awareness.  
For this latter thesis effort, the DISE group used the construct of Business Process 
Re-Engineering (BPR) to frame the analysis and to provide focus in the data collection. 
We also examined the changes to the present EMIO process by developing and 
implementing an organizational simulation using POWER 2.0. Our results indicate that 
when improved Spiral-1 EMIO technologies, which significantly decrease the amount of 
time it takes to fuse collected boarding data into intelligence systems, are combined with 
a redesign of the EMIO organization, a qualitative improvement toward accomplishing 
the overall process can be achieved. The current process requires 35 hours. Yet, with the 
revised technological and proposed organizational changes, the same process can be 
achieved in f i v e hours, thus achieving the SECNAV vision to streamline and improve 
maritime operations. This thesis went on to win the Distinguished Thesis Award in 2009. 
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Key initiatives of this group have included: 
 Fleet Battle Experiments E - K 
 Trident Warrior Sea Trials 03 to 12 
o Ku band Limited Objective Experiment 
 Empire Challenge 05 to 11 
o Joint Battlespace Awareness Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance Integration Capability (JBAIIC) 
o Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (TPED) 
Management 
o Biometrics Analysis 
o Extended Awareness II, III , 06-1, 2 
 MDA 
 Joint Multi-Mission Electro-Optical System (JMMES) 
o JCTD OTA 
 FORCEnet Innovation Research Enterprise (FIRE) 
o Recently awarded a DON/ CIO award for excellence 
o Developed by DISE to support experimentation planning, management, 
and analysis. 
 Joint Intelligence Interoperability Board (JIIB) System Baseline Assessment 
(JSBA) for 2004 and 2006-2009 
 Hull Search Remotely Operated Vehicle (HSROV) 
 Science Advisor to C3F 
Current thesis research has begun to explore how weather data and track 
information can be used in conjunction with other technologies to detect anomalies in the 
behavior of commercial shipping – thus providing increased identification of vessels of 
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interest (VOI). DISE research group theses efforts are supported by NPS Research 
Associate Professor Douglas J. MacKinnon These aligned independent projects received 
student labor and travel support from MDSRP. 
Key sponsorship for DISE group projects has come from NAVNETWARCOM, 
JFCOM, OSD, OPNAV, NAVAIR PMA 263 & 264D, PEO C4I, US Pacific Fleet, 
COMNAVAIRPAC, DIA, SPAWAR and the MDSRP. 
POC: Dr. Doug MacKinnon (djmackin@nps.edu)  
a. Maritime Domain Awareness: Spiral 1 Metrics 
This effort of the DISE Research Group involved installation of an 
overarching concept, processes, procedures, technology, and other system elements is a 
multi-dimensional decision making problem, which requires definition of measures and 
metrics by which acquisition of these system elements can be understood, compared, and 
measured for system performance. However, understanding these system components 
and the means by which they will be understood, compared, and measured has not been 
the subject of specific definition. The purpose of this project was to specify measures and 
metrics that contribute to decision making and continued evolution of MDA system 
elements that contribute within the GWOT, and are also consistent with DoD, JCIDS, 
experimentation and acquisition program needs. 
With the full project title of ―Definition of Metrics for Maritime Domain 
Awareness (MDA) and Global War on Terror (GWOT),‖ this experimentation project 
grew out of Dr. Gallup‘s earlier research work for MDSRP in this topic area. This effort 
was conducted in parallel with an ongoing MDA study to determine current practices for 
MDA across Fleets, resulting in proposed improvements for an MDA Spiral-1 prototype. 
The intent was to use measure and metrics defined in this work to assess Spiral-1 




Figure 43. MDA Spiral-1 program metrics structure 
 
Analysis milestones were defined by the lead researcher, and clustered in 
three distinct phases to align with the concurrent research effort (see Table 6): 
 
Table 6. MDA Spiral-1 Metrics analysis milestones and timeline 
 TITLE TIMELINE 
PHASE 1: Discovery  JUNE – JULY 2007 
PHASE 2: Process reengineering for improved TTP AUG – OCT 2007 
PHASE 3: Delivery, validation and feedback/review of 
proposed Spiral-1 MDA 
NOV 2007 – DEC 2008 
 
Funding for this experimentation project came from OPNAV N3/N5 and 
N6 via PEO C41, and the principal investigator was Dr. Shelly Gallup. The MDSRP 
supported student involvement in this work. Key deliverables included 1) refined 
measures and metrics for MDA contribution to the GWOT, and for Spiral-1 capability; 2) 
a report of field tested use of metrics and measures for military utility; and 3) a report of 
fit measures and metrics within JCIDS. 
POC: Dr. Shelley Gallup (spgallup@nps.edu)  
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b. Maritime Domain Awareness: Assessment  
Acquisition and installation of developed capabilities to meet requirements 
includes a need to demonstrate the capability within an operational context of sufficient 
fidelity and variety to justify the cost and effort at integrating these capabilities within a 
first iteration Sprial-1 MDA system. These capabilities may be organization specific, so 
that no single venue may be sufficient to the demonstration. This experimentation 
included the level of effort and project elements to produce a continuum of 
demonstration, appropriately fit between capability and venue, the collection of necessary 
data and documentation, and results for reporting levels of performance sought in 
establishment of the Spiral-1 MDA capability. 
Led by NPS principal investigator, Dr. Shelly Gallup, this project 
integrated efforts across MDA working groups brought together in operational testing 
under a consistent experiment design process that included standard metrics developed 
for MDA analysis of capabilities. 
 
Figure 44. Joint Capabilities Integrated Development System (JCIDS) capabilities analysis applied to 
MDA assessment 
 
The objective of this experimentation project was to assess proposed 
technology and process capability within the operational context of sufficient fidelity and 
variety to justify the cost and effort of integrating these capabilities within the iteration 
Spiral-X MDA system (see Figure 44).  
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Like the other two linked projects (see report sections II:A:14 and 
II:C:7:a), analysis milestones  (see Table 7) were defined by the lead researcher, and 
clustered in three distinct phases to align with the concurrent research effort: 
Table 7. MDA Assessment analysis milestones and timeline 
 TITLE TIMELINE 
PHASE 1: Discovery  JAN – FEB 2008 
PHASE 2: Process reengineering for improved TTP MAR – OCT 2008 
PHASE 3: Delivery, validation and feedback/review of 
proposed Spiral-X MDA 
NOV 2008 – DEC 2009 
 
Key tasks included: 
 Oversight of an Interagency Operation Center (IOC) event, demonstration 
events in separate venues, and related MDA Spiral-1 specific data collection 
within Trident Warrior 08; ensuring that the events are designed to meet IOC, 
MDA program and technology vendor requirements 
 Development and coordination of assessment objectives with subject matter 
experts and stakeholders, and develop community of interest for assessment 
 Led development, with the participation of all stakeholders, of an integrated 
Data Collection and Assessment Plan (includes objectives, data requirements, 
metrics, roles and responsibilities) 
 Data collection management from all applicable venues, with archiving and 
search capabilities to support multiple requests for information (RFIs) and 
analyses 
 Produced a final report of results in collaboration with stakeholders and other 
assessment leads  
 Coordinated with SPAWAR, technology stakeholders and Fleet 
representatives in preparation for DoD doctrine, organization, training, 
materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) 
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recommendations for a Military Utility Assessment (MUA); then archived 
documentation, event results and associated data relevant to MDA Spiral-1 
 Contributed to definition of Spiral-2 from Spiral-1 assessment and planning 
lessons learned 




Since its founding in January 2004, the MDSRP has provided seed funding for 
new research programs, sponsored student travel and research, created a 1,200 person 
community of interest, created educational programs, and invested in at-sea 
experimentation programs.  In FY10 over 25 students were directly supported in thesis, 
research, and field experimentation programs.  Monthly interdisciplinary meetings are 
held with faculty, students, and off-campus participants, including Stanford Research 
Institute, local law enforcement, and regional FBI agents.  Attendance at these meetings 
averages around 20 people each month.  In FY11 the MDSRP directly funded three 
maritime security research events with Singapore and four other maritime programs.  The 
community of interest is sent a monthly newsletter that shares community research 
programs, national calendar of events, and recent publications in the maritime defense 
and security field. 
The MDSRP was funded with Navy mission funds, and therefore directly 
supported the NPS education mission. The original program memorandum funding the 
MDSRP expired in FY11. In January 2011, after considering several alternatives, NPS 
and NSI leadership decided to close down the MDSRP coordinating function while 
retaining the individual research programs that had independent sponsorship. 
Maritime security remains a complex challenge requiring international, regional, 
interagency, and intergovernmental cooperation. Since the stand-up of the MDSRP in 
2004, the U.S. has developed MDA strategies; created maritime transportation security 
plans; enhanced regional cooperation worldwide to combat maritime terrorism, piracy, 
and smuggling; and designated commands like USNORTHCOM to lead continuing 
national maritime security efforts. Although the MDSRP was officially decommissioned 
on 1 October 2011, individual NPS faculty and students will continue their efforts to 
secure the global maritime commons and better or national maritime security. 
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A. GOALS MET 
In the first eight to fifteen months of the program all but one of the initial goals 
were met. The initial vulnerability assessment was completed, and the ―AS IS‖ system 
architecture description was crafted and distributed on the federal level. An MDA needs 
and requirements document was created, which informed efforts to coordinate MDA 
research across the NPS campus and cross communicate within a developing community 
of interest. The Maritime Domain Protection Modeling and Gaming Laboratory was not 
completed due to a lack of independent sponsorship. However, the MDSRP did support 
maritime domain protection modeling, analysis, and gaming throughout its operational 
lifetime. 
The midterm program goals to be addressed in the first three years were all met, 
some earlier than anticipated. A proposed National Maritime Domain Protection 
Architecture articulating CONOPS and command structure was drafted, and then tested 
in an interagency/joint war game. A database for classified interagency reference was 
created and has been maintained. Port infrastructure analysis in relation to support of U.S. 
force projection was completed through a variety of independent faculty research efforts, 
NPS student theses, and red celling activities. The resulting Center for Infrastructure 
Defense (CID) is one of the many programs given MDSRP seed money that will continue 
on past close of the MDSRP (see report section II:A:14 for program details). Data 
mining and fusion techniques and systems based on requirements generation were 
demonstrated and applied across the DoD. 
The long term program goals were also met. Based on initial MDA architecture 
analysis, the national MDA CONOPS is being implemented. Although no physical 
structure was built, ongoing MDSRP red cell activities fulfilled the requirement to test 
Unified Command Maritime CONOPS. The CID, as mentioned earlier, continues to 
provide complete and updated port infrastructure analysis in relation to support of U.S. 
force projection. Research is still in progress to develop automatic data mining and fusion 
systems for multi-level security access through GSEAS and DISE (see report section 
II:C:6 for program details). Efforts to evaluate alternative platform capabilities for MDA 
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are also still ongoing through the SEA projects (see report section II:A:1:a for program 
details). 
B. PROJECT MATURATION 
As intended from the start, many projects seeded with MDSRP funds have 
matured and are now independently funded, so will continue past the close of the 
MDSRP. A representative sample of these mature programs are summarized in Table 8. 
Table 8. Representative sample of mature programs seeded with MDSRP funds 
PROGRAM TITLE See report section: 
MIST Multimodal Information 
Sharing Team 
II:A:17 
Seaweb Subsurface Acoustic Sensor 
Network 
II:C:5 
HFN Hastily Formed Networks II:C:3 
FIST Field Information Support 
Team 
II:C:2 
GSEAS MDA  NPS Graduate School of 
Engineering and 
Applied Sciences MDA 
Team 
II:A:1:a 
SEA Projects Systems Engineering Analysis 
student projects 
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Underwater Acoustic Channels,‖ Proc. European Conference on Underwater 
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Kapolka, D. and J. K. Wilson, J. A. Rice, P. Hursky (2008). ―Equivalence of the 
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Rice, J. and D. Grimmett (2009). San Francisco Bayweb 2009 Test Plan, April 2009 
Rice, J. and C. W. Ong (2010). ―A Discovery Process for Initializing Underwater 
Acoustic Networks,‖ Proc. Fourth International Conference on Sensor 
Technologies and Applications (SENSORCOMM), Mestre, Italy, July 18-25, 2010 
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NPS Theses listed in this appendix are all on file with the Dudley Knox Library, 
http://www.nps.edu/Library/  
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APPENDIX E: REPRESENTATIVE PARTNERSHIPS 
This is a representative listing provided to demonstrate program breadth and 
reach, and is not intended to be inclusive of all agencies and organizations that were 
involved with the MDSRP at some point during its program lifetime. 
ACADEMIA AND INDUSTRY PARTNERS: 




Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) 
Mercury Data Systems 
Monterey Bay Aquarium Research Institute (MBARI) 
Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS), Middlebury College 
Panetta Institute for Public Policy 




San Francisco State University (SFSU) 
Sensor Island 
Stanford Research Institute (SRI) International  
Stevens Institute for Systems Engineering 
Temasek Labs 
University of California, Berkeley (UC Berkeley) 
University of California, Davis (UC Davis) 
University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) 
 
U.S. GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIPS: 
Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) 
Commander U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMPACFLT) 
Commander Logistics Group, Western Pacific (COMLOG WESTPAC) 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) 
U.S. Department of State (DOS) 
U.S. Department of Transportation - Maritime Administration (DOT-MARAD)  
Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center (FNMOC) 
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Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) 
Marina Police Department 
Maritime Liaison Office (MARLO) 
National MDA Coordination Office (NMCO) formerly OGMSA 
National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) 
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) 
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) 
National Security Administration (NSA) 
Navy Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program (TENCAP)  
Naval Network Warfare Command (NETWARCOM) 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) 
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) 
Office of Naval Research (ONR) 
Office of the Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) 
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) 
U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) disestablished in August 2011 
U.S. Navy Forces North (NAVNORTH) 
U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) 
U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) 
U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 
U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) 
 
INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS: 
DSO National Laboratories, Singapore 
Singapore Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) 
Nanyang Technical University (NTU) 
Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF)  
Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTArF)  
Royal Thai Army (RTA) 
The National University of Singapore (NUS) 
Singapore‘s Defense Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) 
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